Understanding  Sanctuary Cities by Lasch, Christopher N. et al.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 5 Article 5
5-29-2018
Understanding "Sanctuary Cities"
Christopher N. Lasch
University of Denver Sturm College of Law, clasch@law.du.edu
R. Linus Chan
University of Minnesota Law School, rlchan@umn.edu
Ingrid V. Eagly
UCLA School of Law, eagly@law.ucla.edu
Dina Francesca Haynes
New England School of Law, dhaynes@nesl.edu
Annie Lai
University of California, Irvine School of Law, alai@law.uci.edu
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher N. Lasch, R. L. Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina F. Haynes, Annie Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf,
Understanding "Sanctuary Cities", 59 B.C.L. Rev. 1703 (2018), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss5/5
Understanding "Sanctuary Cities"
Authors
Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai, Elizabeth M.
McCormick, and Juliet P. Stumpf
This article is available in Boston College Law Review: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss5/5
  1703 
UNDERSTANDING “SANCTUARY CITIES” 
CHRISTOPHER N. LASCH, R. LINUS CHAN, INGRID V. EAGLY, DINA FRANCESCA 
HAYNES, ANNIE LAI, ELIZABETH M. MCCORMICK & JULIET P. STUMPF 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1705 
I. THE RISE OF CRIMMIGRATION ............................................................................................... 1712 
A. President Trump’s Promise to End Sanctuary Cities ....................................................... 1713 
B. Crimmigration’s Origins .................................................................................................. 1719 
C. Crimmigration’s Enforcement Mechanisms ..................................................................... 1723 
1. The Criminal Alien Program ....................................................................................... 1724 
2. The 287(g) Program .................................................................................................... 1725 
3. ICE Administrative Warrants ...................................................................................... 1728 
4. The Secure Communities Program .............................................................................. 1730 
5. Other Joint Operations ................................................................................................. 1734 
II. “SANCTUARY” POLICIES IN AN ERA OF MASS DEPORTATION .............................................. 1736 
A. Barring Investigation of Civil and Criminal Immigration Violations ............................... 1739 
B. Limiting Compliance with Immigration Detainers and  Administrative Warrants ........... 1741 
C. Refusing ICE Access to Jails ............................................................................................ 1743 
D. Limiting Disclosure of Sensitive Information ................................................................... 1745 
E. Precluding Participation in Joint Operations with  Federal Immigration Enforcement .. 1748 
III. LEGAL AND POLICY RATIONALES FOR “SANCTUARY” ........................................................ 1752 
A. Maintain Local Control Over Criminal Justice ................................................................ 1754 
B. Prevent Unlawful Arrests ................................................................................................. 1758 
C. Strengthen Community Trust ........................................................................................... 1761 
D. Safeguard Equal Protection ............................................................................................. 1764 
E. Promote Diversity and Inclusivity .................................................................................... 1768 
F. Express Disagreement with Federal Immigration Policy ................................................. 1771 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 1773 
 
  1704 
UNDERSTANDING “SANCTUARY CITIES” 
CHRISTOPHER N. LASCH,* R. LINUS CHAN,** INGRID V. EAGLY,*** 
DINA FRANCESCA HAYNES,**** ANNIE LAI,***** ELIZABETH M. 
MCCORMICK****** & JULIET P. STUMPF******* 
Abstract: In the wake of President Trump’s election, a growing number of lo-
cal jurisdictions around the country have sought to disentangle their criminal 
justice apparatus from federal immigration enforcement efforts. These locali-
ties have embraced a series of reforms that attempt to ensure immigrants are 
not deported when they come into contact with the criminal justice system. 
The Trump administration has labeled these jurisdictions “sanctuary cities” 
and vowed to “end” them by, among other things, attempting to cut off their 
federal funding.  
This Article is a collaborative project authored by law professors specializing 
in the intersection between immigration and criminal law. In it, we set forth 
the central features of the Trump administration’s mass deportation plans and 
its campaign to “crack down” on sanctuary cities. We then outline the diverse 
ways in which localities have sought to protect their residents by refusing to 
participate in the Trump immigration agenda. Such initiatives include declin-
ing to honor immigration detainers, precluding participation in joint opera-
tions with the federal government, and preventing immigration agents from 
accessing local jails. Finally, we analyze the legal and policy justifications that 
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local jurisdictions have advanced. Our examination reveals important insights 
for how sanctuary cities are understood and preserved in the age of Trump. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 26, 2017, Donald Trump announced before a crowd in 
Youngstown, Ohio that his administration was “launching a nationwide 
crackdown on sanctuary cities.”1 In so doing, he was fulfilling a campaign 
promise to “end” sanctuary cities and pressure them to abandon their sanc-
tuary policies by threatening to withhold federal funding.2 Although Presi-
dent Trump’s definition of “sanctuary jurisdictions” has been imprecise, he 
has generally used the term to refer to those local jurisdictions that choose 
not to cooperate with federal deportation efforts.3 Trump’s aim was and 
continues to be to punish those localities that do not help carry out his plans 
for mass deportation. 
This Article—which is a collaboration among law professors specializ-
ing in the intersection between immigration and criminal law and enforce-
ment—engages the growing national debate on so-called “sanctuary cit-
ies.”4 We sought one another out for this multi-author project in order to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Alana Abramson, ‘I Can Be More Presidential Than Any President.’ Read Trump’s Ohio 
Rally Speech, TIME (July 26, 2017), http://time.com/4874161/donald-trump-transcript-youngs
town-ohio/ [https://perma.cc/9HP4-ADFB]. 
 2 Full Text: Donald Trump Immigration Speech in Arizona, POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:54 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-immigration-address-transcript-227614 
[https://perma.cc/33MN-5W7A]; see also Donald Trump’s Contract with the American Voter, DON-
ALD J. TRUMP (Oct. 2016) [hereinafter Trump’s Contract], https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_
landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf [https://perma.cc/E384-B85W]. 
 3 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Interior 
Enforcement Executive Order]. In one place, the Executive Order appeared to define “sanctuary 
jurisdictions” as those that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.” Id. at 8801. Although, 
it was also susceptible to a reading that would encompass jurisdictions that decline to comply with 
immigration detainers or have “a policy or practice that hinders the enforcement of Federal law 
. . . .” Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 519–21 (N.D. Cal. 2017), reconsidera-
tion denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 4 As other scholars concur, the term “sanctuary” lacks a single agreed upon definition. See, 
e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, “Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1197; Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Networks, MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 8–13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3038943 [https://perma.cc/T979-2GQ3]. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has defined sanc-
tuary cities in general terms as “jurisdictions that may have state laws, local ordinances, or de-
partmental policies limiting the role of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the en-
forcement of immigration laws.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. AUDIT 
DIV., COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE 
UNITED STATES 7 n.44 (Jan. 2007), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WDU6-AYAC]. The Center for Immigration Studies has developed on its own defini-
tion of “sanctuary” to construct a map and long list of both state and municipalities that are appar-
ently “obstructing immigration enforcement.” Bryan Griffith & Jessica Vaughan, Map 1: Sanctu-
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promote a deeper understanding of the struggle between restrictive federal 
immigration policymaking and local criminal justice priorities. In this Arti-
cle, we analyze sanctuary policies that seek to disentangle federal immigra-
tion enforcement from local criminal justice systems.5 Our overarching goal 
is to understand what jurisdictions are doing vis-à-vis criminal justice disen-
tanglement and the rationales that support such initiatives. 
Our Article makes three primary contributions to the literature on sanc-
tuary cities.6 First, we identify the elements of the enforcement apparatus the 
Trump administration is using to conduct mass deportations and attack sanc-
tuary cities. Although the Obama administration deported large numbers of 
immigrants and significantly increased the use of immigration detention,7 it 
was eventually forced to adopt reforms that had the effect of reducing local 
                                                                                                                           
ary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (July 27, 2017), https://cis.
org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States [https://perma.cc/895D-8RDJ].  
 5 SARAH S. HERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE AND LOCAL “SANCTUARY” POLICIES 
LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 15–16 (Mar. 2017), https://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=799960 [https://perma.cc/Z8R9-VABT] (discussing the decision by some state 
and local governments to refuse participation in immigration enforcement through “sanctuary” 
policies). 
 6 For examples of important earlier scholarship on sanctuary cities, see SUSAN BIBLER 
COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM AND THE U.S. SANCTUARY MOVE-
MENT (1993); PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMI-
GRATION FEDERALISM (2015); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 58–59, 
81–85 (2014); Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime? The Politics of Immi-
gration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 71, 75 (2012); Ming 
H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After 
Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13 (2016); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration 
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: 
States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2011) (describing certain 
state attempts at immigration reform as being constrained by “forced federalism”); Trevor George 
Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the Anti-Commandeering Rule in the Homeland Security Era: 
Immigrant Sanctuary as an Illustrative Case, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313 (2015); Bill Ong 
Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and 
Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247 (2012); Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities 
and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159 (2016); Huyen 
Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigra-
tion Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006) [hereinafter Pham, Constitutional Right]; Huyen 
Pham & Pham Hoang Van, State-Created Immigration Climates and Domestic Migration, 38 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 181 (2016); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Rick Su, The Promise and Peril of Cities and Immi-
gration Policy, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 299 (2013); Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” 
and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010). 
 7 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2015 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 103 (Dec. 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Yearbook_Immigration_Statistics_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/S973-LUDX] (reporting that over 
2.7 million immigrants were removed from the United States during the Obama administration); 
ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED DETENTION: CURRENT LEG-
ISLATIVE ISSUES 13 (Jan. 2012), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32369.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN3Q-
LAM6] (graphing the dramatic increase in the use of detention from 2001 to 2012). 
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law enforcement participation in federal immigration enforcement. These 
reforms are now being rolled back by a current administration that appears 
intent on setting new enforcement records,8 in large part by co-opting the bu-
reaucracy of local criminal justice systems. These mechanisms include ac-
tions such as accessing local jails to arrest immigrants, asking local jurisdic-
tions to hold immigrants for deportation purposes, and deputizing local police 
to enforce immigration law. Our overview reveals a key insight crucial to 
understanding the current sanctuary debate: The debate over sanctuary cities, 
although more pronounced in the age of Trump, has history and roots that 
extend further back in time to transformations in immigration and criminal 
justice policy dating to the 1980s. One cannot understand sanctuary cities 
without understanding this history. 
Second, based on our analysis of ordinances and policies from jurisdic-
tions around the country, we provide a current typology of five major cate-
gories of sanctuary policies that the immigration enforcement programs and 
initiatives just described have inspired. The five policy types that have been 
adopted by jurisdictions to resist entanglement of state and local law en-
forcement in federal immigration enforcement include: (1) barring investi-
gation of civil and criminal immigration violations by local law enforce-
ment, (2) limiting compliance with immigration detainers and immigration 
warrants, (3) refusing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
access to local jails, (4) limiting local law enforcement’s disclosure of sensi-
tive information, and (5) precluding local participation in joint operations 
with federal immigration enforcement. Whereas some jurisdictions had these 
types of policies in place well before Trump was elected,9 many others 
adopted or reaffirmed such policies in the wake of the election. An im-
portant aspect of this component of our project is the compilation, in a pub-
lic online library, of all the policies and laws that we considered in our re-
                                                                                                                           
 8 Since the 2016 presidential election there have been significant increases in “book-ins” and 
removals arising from interior immigration enforcement. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 10–12 (Dec. 
2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J57M-V7C3]. The average daily detention population increased to 37,000 in 
fiscal year 2017, and President Trump’s budget for 2018 called for funding 48,000 beds. Laurel 
Wamsley, As It Makes More Arrests, ICE Looks for More Detention Centers, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Oct. 26, 2017, 4:36 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/26/560257834/as-it-
makes-more-arrests-ice-looks-for-more-detention-centers [https://perma.cc/FDR9-NKQ5]. 
 9 See Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctu-
ary City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 546–48 (2017) (describing three “waves” of 
sanctuary policies during the period from the early 1980s to the mid-2010s); Pham, Constitutional 
Right, supra note 6, at 1382–87 (tracing the origins of sanctuary policies from the Central Ameri-
can refugee crisis of the 1980s to state and local laws enacted after the events of September 11, 
2001).  
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search.10 We recognize that the five types of measures we study comple-
ment other types of policies that localities may enact outside the criminal 
justice space to integrate immigrants into the broader social fabric of the 
community, such as policies that allow immigrants to receive in-state tuition 
or obtain driver’s licenses.11 We also recognize that jurisdictions can adopt 
reforms in the criminal justice space beyond those studied in this Article 
that have a beneficial impact on immigrants.12 
Third, we examine some of the major legal and policy rationales that 
have driven localities time and time again to enact “sanctuary” policies. 
Following the November 2016 election, mayors, police chiefs, and other 
local officials—in some cases supported by officials at the state level—
came forward to denounce Trump’s vision of mass deportation.13 They 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”—Online Appendix: Home, WESTMINSTER LAW 
LIBR. (last updated Apr. 8, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/c.php?g=705342 [https://perma.cc/
E2GZ-EPM5]. The policies available in the online appendix can be sorted either by state or by the 
adoption date. See id. (follow “Policies sorted by state” or “Policies sorted by date” tabs). 
 11 See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 81–85 (describing a spectrum of policies that pro-
tect or integrate unauthorized migrants, including municipal identification cards, eligibility for 
driver’s licenses, and resident tuition); Peter J. Spiro, Formalizing Local Citizenship, 37 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 559, 563–66 (2010) (describing various kinds of local policies supporting nonciti-
zens, including noncitizen voting in local elections, extending welfare benefits and in-state tuition 
to noncitizens, and municipal identity cards available to all members of the local community, and 
acknowledging that “sanctuary” policies “may also spring from some sense of locally-delimited 
community,” though in Spiro’s view, “sanctuary” contrasts with these other measures because it is 
“about defeating federal immigration enforcement”); Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No 
More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 877–88 (2015) (summarizing the 
range of policies advanced by states and localities to integrate immigrants). 
 12 See, e.g., FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT ET AL., THE PROMISE OF SANCTUARY CITIES AND 
THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS IN AN ERA OF MASS DEPORTATION passim (Apr. 
2017), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/FPP-Sanctuary-Cities-Report-Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ULT9-KGUW] (urging cities committed to immigrant-protective policies to 
consider a range of changes to address problems with the criminal justice system); TANIA A. UN-
ZUETA, MIJENTE, EXPANDING SANCTUARY: WHAT MAKES A CITY A SANCTUARY NOW? 1 (Jan. 
2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1xgl8UTis-QLUYtbndueGtVaVE/view [https://perma.cc/
A4CM-WUKA] (arguing that cities should address “the criminalization of Black people, 
transgender women, and other people of color as a part of the minimum standard in defining a city 
as a ‘sanctuary’ today”).  
 13 See, e.g., Kate Mather & Cindy Chang, LAPD Will Not Help Deport Immigrants Under 
Trump, Chief Says, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016, 3:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-los-angeles-police-immigration-20161114-story.html [https://perma.cc/3HLE-8TRT] (“We 
are not going to engage in law enforcement activities solely based on somebody’s immigration 
status. We are not going to work in conjunction with Homeland Security on deportation efforts. 
That is not our job, nor will I make it our job.” (quoting Los Angeles Police Department 
(“LAPD”) Chief Charlie Beck) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Liz Robbins, On Staten Is-
land, Immigrants ‘Hope for the Best but Prepare for the Worst,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/nyregion/undocumented-latinos-meet-to-plan-for-uncertain-
future.html [https://perma.cc/JR83-XH3F] (“We are not going to sacrifice a half-million people 
who live amongst us who are part of our communities.” (quoting New York City Mayor Bill de 
Blasio) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gary Kane, Philly’s Sanctuary City Status Threatened 
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made clear that “sanctuary” was necessary to prevent irreparable harm to 
their communities. Although the specific rationales of different jurisdictions 
are varied, they generally agree that immigrant protective policies are an 
important way to preserve local sovereignty, define local priorities, and en-
hance community trust in law enforcement. Such policies are also under-
stood as crucial to protecting fundamental rights, such as the right to live 
free from racial profiling, illegal searches and stops, and arrests without 
probable cause. More to the core, many sanctuary city laws and policies are 
designed to embrace a diverse and inclusive vision of community. Finally, 
while often not the primary rationale, some localities have enacted “sanctu-
ary” policies as a form of expressed disagreement with federal immigration 
policy. 
Although we rely on the term “sanctuary” in this Article, we realize 
that the term is deeply contested and lacks a commonly accepted meaning.14 
The term sanctuary first emerged in the dominant immigrant rights dis-
course in the 1980s when it was associated with faith communities provid-
ing temporary sanctuary within churches to persons fleeing Central Ameri-
can violence.15 The term reemerged as part of what has been called the New 
Sanctuary Movement in 2007, in which coalitions of faith-based and other 
groups sought to support and integrate members of the undocumented 
                                                                                                                           
Under Trump Administration, METRO (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.metro.us/philadelphia/philly-
s-sanctuary-city-status-threatened-under-trump-administration/zsJpkk---5u7en8W5aEanw [https://
perma.cc/9E9A-DM5P] (“We respect and live up to the Fourth Amendment, which means you 
can’t be held against your will without a warrant from the court signed by a judge.” (quoting Phil-
adelphia Mayor Jim Kenney) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Journal North Staff, Gonzales 
Reiterates Santa Fe’s Pro-Immigrant Stance After Trump’s Election Win, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov 
15, 2016, 6:04 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/889149/mayor-reiterates-santa-fes-pro-immigrant-
stance-after-trumps-election-win.html [https://perma.cc/DG43-H73P] (“[O]ur policy of human 
rights for all immigrants . . . has benefited our people, made us a safer, more cooperative commu-
nity, and strengthened our economy . . . .” (quoting Santa Fe Mayor Javier Gonzales) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 14 See Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immi-
gration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 169 
n.12 (2016) (noting that “[t]here is no definition of ‘sanctuary’ in federal law and there is a wide 
and diverse range of activities that might qualify as a ‘sanctuary’”); Virgil Wiebe, Immigration 
Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 581 
(2017) (discussing varying meanings of sanctuary as applied to the home, church, schools, cities, 
and states on the federal level). 
 15 See generally HILLARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND CAESAR AT THE RIO GRANDE: SANCTU-
ARY AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION (1995) (discussing the history and growth of the sanctuary 
movement in the southwest United States in the 1980s); Susan Bibler Coutin, From Refugees to 
Immigrants: The Legalization Strategies of Salvadoran Immigrants and Activists, 32 INT’L MI-
GRATION REV. 901, 906–09 (1998) (describing the social and legal impacts of the sanctuary 
movement by religious activists in 1980s); Norma Stoltz Chinchilla et al., The Sanctuary Move-
ment and Central American Activism in Los Angeles, LATIN AM. PERSP., Nov. 2009, at 101 
(providing important insights into the start of the sanctuary movement in Los Angeles). 
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community.16 Today, many local governments have affirmatively adopted 
the “sanctuary” label.17 Other jurisdictions have adopted similar policies 
with different labels—such as that of an “Inclusive City,”18 a “Human 
Rights City,”19 or a “Welcoming City”20—or eschewed labels altogether.21 
Recognizing the definitional tension, we nevertheless use the term “sanctu-
ary” in this Article because it is the term that has been most commonly em-
braced by both the jurisdictions themselves and critics of local resistance to 
federal immigration enforcement.22 
Not only is the word “sanctuary” contestable, but, as the title of our 
Article reflects, so is the concept of “sanctuary cities.” Although it is cities 
that adopted many of the early policies in solidarity with the faith-based 
sanctuary movement in the 1980s,23 the current sanctuary landscape extends 
                                                                                                                           
 16 GRACE YUKICH, ONE FAMILY UNDER GOD: IMMIGRATION POLITICS AND PROGRESSIVE 
RELIGION IN AMERICA 13–38 (2013) (tracing the roots of the “New Sanctuary Movement” to a 
2007 religious effort to humanize undocumented immigrants); Grace Yukich, Constructing the 
Model Immigrant: Movement Strategy and Immigrant Deservingness in the New Sanctuary 
Movement, 60 SOC. PROBS. 302, 306 (2013) [hereinafter Yukich, Model Immigrant] (same). 
 17 See, e.g., Watsonville, Cal., Ordinance No. 1353-17 § 2 (May 9, 2017) [hereinafter Wat-
sonville Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=3573928 [https://perma.cc/
N4KN-Z5NM] (“The purpose of this ordinance is to reaffirm the City of Watsonville’s status as a 
Sanctuary City . . . .”); Boulder, Colo., Ordinance No. 8162, § 12-5-1(b)(7) (Jan. 3, 2017) [herein-
after Boulder Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34430755 [https://perma.
cc/EG4M-56FX] (adding code section stating “[t]he City of Boulder declares that it is a ‘sanctu-
ary’ city”). 
 18 See, e.g., McMinville, Or., Res. 2017-03 (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter McMinville Resolu-
tion], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34431012 [https://perma.cc/KRV7-EGZ8]. 
 19 See, e.g., Richmond, Cal., Res. 106-16 (Dec. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Richmond Resolution], 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432066 [https://perma.cc/59VH-PMQ2]. 
 20 See, e.g., Chi., Ill., Code § 2-173-005 (2012) [hereinafter Chicago Welcoming City Ordi-
nance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434721 [https://perma.cc/628R-2VU9]. 
 21 See, e.g., Denver, Co., City Council Bill No. 17-0940 (Aug. 31, 2017), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35423250 [https://perma.cc/6EHT-87ZJ] (enacting disentanglement policy 
titled the “Public Safety Enforcement Priorities Act”). But “studiously avoiding” the term “sanctu-
ary” did not convince the Trump administration, which included Denver when it launched “Opera-
tion Safe City,” a set of immigration raids that explicitly targeted “sanctuary cities.” Chris Walker, 
ICE Raids Target “Sanctuary Jurisdictions,” Including Denver, WESTWORD (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:07 
AM), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35423250 [https://perma.cc/5489-G5LT]. 
 22 While we focus on governmental forms of “sanctuary,” including legislative enactments 
and formal policy measures, others have noted a burgeoning of other forms of sanctuary, including 
that offered by churches and campus. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 4, (manuscript at 30–
33); see also Natasha Newman, Note, A Place to Call Home: Defining the Legal Significance of 
the Sanctuary Campus Movement, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 122, 130–31 (2017). 
 23 Ignatius Bau, Cities of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local 
Government Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 50–52 (1994) (reporting cities that 
joined the sanctuary movement beginning in 1985, but also noting some state-level action); see 
also Cambridge, Mass., City Council Order No. 4 (Apr. 8, 1985), http://libguides.law.du.edu/
ld.php?content_id=34434956 [https://perma.cc/T6RU-TW85] (ordering “[t]hat Cambridge be 
declared ‘A Sanctuary City’”); Ithaca, N.Y., Human Servs. Comm. Res., Sanctuary for Salvadoran 
and Guatemalan Refugees (July 10, 1985), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=3909
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far beyond cities. Whereas some self-styled “sanctuary cities” exist today,24 
hundreds of today’s sanctuary policies have been enacted at the county lev-
el.25 For example, several sheriffs that operate jails in more rural areas have 
decided to stop complying with immigration detainers.26 Meanwhile, state-
level sanctuary legislation is also on the rise.27 Even towns and boroughs 
                                                                                                                           
0895 [https://perma.cc/3NUX-HYLD] (declaring Ithaca “a ‘Sanctuary City’ for Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan refugees”); cf. Berkeley, Cal., Res. 52, 596-N.S. (Feb. 19, 1985), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35160626 [https://perma.cc/W7M6-DAE4] (“Declaring Berkeley a City 
of Refuge”); S.F., Cal., Res. No. 1087-85 (Dec. 27, 1985), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=35739145 (declarating the same for San Francisco). 
 24 See Watsonville Ordinance, supra note 17; Boulder Ordinance, supra note 17. 
 25 See LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., SEARCHING FOR 
SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH 
DEPORTATIONS 3–4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_
report_final_1-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJA8-ERJM] (arguing that counties are “the most im-
portant policy-makers in terms of establishing sanctuary policies” because “in the majority of the 
U.S., the county-level government manages the jails and the legal system, and that is where the 
greatest entanglement with immigration enforcement occurs”); KRSNA AVILA ET AL., IMMIGRANT 
LEGAL RES. CTR., THE RISE OF SANCTUARY: GETTING LOCAL OFFICERS OUT OF THE BUSINESS 
OF DEPORTATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA 25 (Jan. 2018), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/
resources/rise_of_sanctuary-lg-20180201.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP4P-MNQQ] (noting that “over 
400 counties moved to decrease their engagement with ICE”); Juliet P. Stumpf, D(E)volving Dis-
cretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1280 
(2015) (noting that “more than thirty Oregon counties” and “most counties in Colorado” an-
nounced they would no longer comply with immigration detainers). 
 26 See, e.g., National Map of Local Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. 
(Jan. 25, 2018) [hereinafter National Map], https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map [https://
perma.cc/L8V7-NNH2] (showing numerous rural counties, including Garfield (WA), Park (WY), 
Butte (SD), Lake (OR), White Pine (NV), Baca (CO), and Lake of the Woods (MN) do not com-
ply with immigration detainers). 
 27 A.B. 4, ch. 570 § 1(d), 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) [hereinafter California TRUST 
Act], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34433552 [https://perma.cc/J24E-NZ7A]; 
H.B. 6659, Public Act No. 13-155, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013), http://libguides.law.du.edu/
ld.php?content_id=34434308 [https://perma.cc/X73B-BN92]. For a discussion of state-level crim-
inal justice reform in California designed to protect immigrants, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal 
Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 12 
(2017); see also FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 12 (highlighting the ways states 
can play an important role in reforming the criminal justice system to protect noncitizens from 
deportation). 
 In other cases, states and localities have been pitted against one another. In Texas, for example, a 
coalition of cities and counties sued the State of Texas to enjoin enforcement of Texas’s S.B. 4, 
which forbade localities from establishing “sanctuary” policies and required them to cooperate with 
federal immigration authorities, for example by “comply[ing] with, honor[ing], and fulfill[ing]” im-
migration detainer requests. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018) (addressing 
litigation brought by local governments and officials); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 
2.251(a)(1)–(2) (West 2017); see also Brianne Pfannenstiel, Iowa ‘Sanctuary’ City Ban Signed into 
Law, DES MOINES REGISTER (Apr. 11, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/
news/politics/2018/04/10/iowa-sanctuary-city-ban-becomes-law-sf-481-reynolds-signs/504176002/ 
[https://perma.cc/UK4X-SLUH] (describing similar anti-sanctuary law enacted in Iowa). In Califor-
nia, some localities have sided with the Trump administration in its stance against California’s “sanc-
tuary” law. Sarah N. Lynch, California County Joins Trump ‘Sanctuary City’ Lawsuit, REUTERS 
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have enacted sanctuary policies.28 The Trump administration’s continued 
preference for the “sanctuary city” moniker, despite its lack of precision, 
may betray a strategic targeting of “liberal” urban centers.29 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we examine the current 
context—specifically, how the election of Donald Trump has catapulted so-
called “sanctuary” jurisdiction policies to the forefront of the national de-
bate over immigration policy.30 We ground the current sanctuary debate in 
the rise of a “crimmigration” enforcement regime, and specifically, the in-
creasing reliance on the criminal justice bureaucracy for federal immigra-
tion enforcement.31 And we provide history essential to understanding the 
current moment. In Part II we introduce our typology of five primary types 
of criminal justice policies that local jurisdictions have adopted to disentan-
gle their law enforcement systems from the federal immigration enforce-
ment machinery.32 Finally, in Part III we analyze six of the more significant 
legal and policy rationales that localities have offered to justify their adop-
tion and maintenance of immigrant-protective “sanctuary” policies.33 
I. THE RISE OF CRIMMIGRATION 
Ending “sanctuary cities” has been a central preoccupation of the 
Trump presidency since its inception. In order to carry out its plans for vast-
ly expanding immigration enforcement, the Trump administration must se-
                                                                                                                           
(Mar. 27, 2018, 3:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-sanctuary-city/california-
county-joins-trump-sanctuary-city-lawsuit-idUSKBN1H32SA [https://perma.cc/HU8B-64F6]; see 
also Sarah Holder, As California Protects Immigrants, Cities Revolt, CITYLAB (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/california-cities-fight-their-sanctuary-state/556973 [https://
perma.cc/FMB8-PBLH] (describing other anti-sanctuary actions taken by California localities). An 
important forthcoming article is expected to address such state-local conflicts over sanctuary. See 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rose Cuison Villazor & Rick Su, Anti-Sanctuary (forthcoming), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141293. 
 28 See, e.g., BREWSTER, MASS., SPECIAL & ANNUAL TOWN MEETING WARRANT art. 31 (May 1, 
2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35739776 [https://perma.cc/3YUP-TEMD]; 
State College, Pa., Res. 1180 (Jan. 9, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=3443
6664 [https://perma.cc/CKZ6-LLBN]. 
 29 See, e.g., Ishaan Tharoor, Trump and the Populists See Themselves at War with Big Cities, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/20/
trump-and-the-populists-see-themselves-at-war-with-big-cities/?utm_term=.b4ca7345ee67 [https://
perma.cc/YS4D-DC9S] (exploring role of anti-urban sentiment in the Trump administration’s 
populism). 
 30 See infra notes 34–165 and accompanying text. 
 31 One of our co-authors, Juliet Stumpf, coined the term “crimmigration” in her seminal 2006 
law review article on the topic. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
 32 See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 252–356 and accompanying text. 
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cure the participation of state and local law enforcement officials.34 In en-
gaging state and local officials, however, the administration is not starting 
from scratch. Since the 1980s the federal government has placed an ever-
increasing amount of pressure on state and local officials to become in-
volved in immigration enforcement. What began as an invitation to states 
and localities in the 1980s and 1990s became a near-command to turn over 
local residents for deportation by the end of Obama’s first term. Toward the 
end of the Obama administration, several important reforms were adopted 
in response to public outcry over the federal government’s actions. But, as 
we discuss in this Part, those reforms are now being undone by the new 
administration.35  
A. President Trump’s Promise to End Sanctuary Cities 
One of Trump’s most common refrains during his campaign came in 
the form of a threat—that “[c]ities that refuse to cooperate with federal 
[immigration] authorities will not receive taxpayer dollars.”36 After the in-
auguration, his administration moved quickly to implement the promises the 
President made on the campaign trail. On January 25, 2017, Trump signed 
two executive orders on immigration; one focused on border enforcement,37 
and the other was designed to vastly expand enforcement in the interior.38 
                                                                                                                           
  34 The President directed ICE to hire 10,000 new agents. Interior Enforcement Executive 
Order, supra note 3, at 8800. Nevertheless, former Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly 
thought that these targets would not be reached “within the next couple of years.” Associated 
Press, Border Patrol May Loosen Lie-Detector Use in Hiring to Meet Trump’s Jobs Order, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2017, 6:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/08/border-
patrol-lie-detector-test-new-hires-trump-jobs-order [https://perma.cc/RYF7-R5AW]. 
 35 See infra notes 98–100, 114–117, 149–154 and accompanying text. See generally Bill Ong 
Hing, Entering the Trump ICE Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration Enforcement Regime, 5 
TEX. A&M L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3032662 [https://perma.cc/9VUY-BJD2] (cataloguing the ways immigration enforcement has 
intensified and become more extreme under the Trump administration). 
 36 POLITICO, supra note 2; see also Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump 
Wants to Do in His First 100 Days, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 9, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.
npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-his-first-100-days [https://
perma.cc/PPU2-VFEE] (noting Trump’s promise to “cancel all federal funding to Sanctuary Cit-
ies”). 
 37 Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8794 (Jan. 25, 2017) (directing the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary to “take all appropriate steps to immediately 
plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border”). 
 38 Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8800 (expanding priorities for en-
forcement to include any noncitizen with a criminal conviction, those charged with a crime, those 
thought to have committed acts that would constitute a crime, and any other person deemed a 
public safety threat by immigration officials). Reports circulated that the expanded priorities could 
cover up to 8 million people. See, e.g., Brian Bennett, Not Just ‘Bad Hombres’: Trump Is Target-
ing Up to 8 Million People for Deportation, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-na-pol-trump-deportations-20170204-story.html [https://perma.cc/X8BF-8AR3]. 
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The executive order addressing interior enforcement also took direct aim at 
“sanctuary jurisdictions,” accusing them of “willfully violat[ing] Federal 
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States.”39 
According to Trump’s order, “[t]hese jurisdictions have caused immeasura-
ble harm to the American people and to the very fabric of our Republic.”40 
The interior enforcement executive order further charged the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Secretary of Homeland Security with ensuring that these juris-
dictions “are not eligible to receive Federal grants, except as deemed neces-
sary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or the Secre-
tary.”41 Trump administration officials have even gone so far as to call for 
the arrest of city officials who are in charge of these “sanctuary cities.”42 
The false characterization of sanctuary cities as dangerous and harmful 
was not unexpected.43 Throughout his campaign, Trump relied on a rhetoric 
of immigrant criminality to support his harsh immigration enforcement pro-
posals.44 At his campaign launch in June 2015, Trump described Mexican 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8799. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 8801. 
 42 Adam K. Raymond, Acting ICE Director Wants to Arrest Politicians Running Sanctuary 
Cities, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 3, 2018, 10:34 AM) http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/acting-
ice-director-wants-to-arrest-pols-in-sanctuary-cities.html [https://perma.cc/D6YW-DCUV]. But see 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Trump’s Fuzzy Math on Undocumented Immigrants Convicted of Crimes, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/09/02/
trumps-fuzzy-math-on-undocumented-immigrants-convicted-of-crimes/?utm_term=.87986e14c121 
[https://perma.cc/6L7C-PLHD] (citing data from the Migration Policy Institute showing that the 
number of undocumented immigrants with criminal convictions was less than half of what Trump 
claimed). 
 43 The characterization has been consistently contracticed by empirical research showing that 
sanctuary jurisdictions are, on the whole, safer than non-sanctuary jurisdictions. See, e.g., TOM K. 
WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE 
ECONOMY 1 (Jan. 2017), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Effects-Sanctuary-
Policies-Crime-and-Economy-2017-01-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6FY-7M7G] (concluding that 
“[c]rime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to nonsanctuary coun-
ties”); MIKE MALES, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WHITE RESIDENTS OF URBAN SANC-
TUARY COUNTIES ARE SAFER FROM DEADLY VIOLENCE THAN WHITE RESIDENTS IN NON-
SANCTUARY COUNTIES 1 (Dec. 2017), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/white_residents_
of_urban_sanctuary_counties.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UTW-G52L] (concluding that White resi-
dents are safer in sanctuary areas and non-White residents “generally experience greater safety in 
counties with at least some sanctuary policies”); see also Andrew Forrester & Alex Nowrasteh, 
Do Immigration Enforcement Programs Reduce Crime? Evidence from the 287(g) Program in 
North Carolina 13 (CATO Inst., Working Paper No. 52, 2018), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.
org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-52-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K23-4QLT] (concluding that 
participation in the 287(g) program discussed Part I.C.2, infra notes 101–117 and accompanying 
text, “did not reduce crime in North Carolina”). 
 44 Scholars conducting an analysis of Trump’s rhetoric during and after the campaign found it 
revealed a classic America as “fortress” trope: 
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immigrants as drug dealers and rapists: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re 
bringing crime. They’re rapists.”45 After securing the Republican nomina-
tion, Trump gave a speech dedicated to immigration issues in Phoenix, Ari-
zona in which he claimed there were “at least 2 million” so-called “criminal 
aliens” in the United States and pledged that his administration would have 
“[z]ero tolerance for criminal aliens. Zero. Zero. . . . Zero.”46 
Trump’s identification of sanctuary cities as protecting “criminal al-
iens” appeared most powerfully in his campaign statements about the kill-
ing of Kathryn Steinle by an undocumented immigrant in 2015.47 Trump 
mentioned Steinle and other citizens killed by immigrants when he accepted 
the Republican nomination, asking “where was sanctuary for Kate Steinle” 
and for “all the other Americans who have been so brutally murdered, and 
who have suffered so horribly?”48 For Trump, Steinle’s death was “another 
                                                                                                                           
Trump asserts that Fortress America is under attack; many of its cities and towns 
have been overrun by ruthless aggressors. Trump characterizes Mexico as the enemy 
that sent unauthorized immigrants as invaders. Trump represents himself as the hero, 
and Hillary Clinton represents the corrupt and sniveling politicians that let the nation 
come to this state of affairs. 
CELESTE GÓMEZ ET AL., THE PRESIDENT’S INTENT: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF A CRITICAL 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF TRUMP’S SPEECHES AND TWEETS FROM THE DATE OF HIS CANDIDACY 
TO MID-SEPTEMBER 2017, at 1 (Dec. 2017), https://www.thepresidentsintent.com/full-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZL7-7FGS]. The myth of immigrant criminality has repeatedly been disproven 
by researchers. See Michael T. Light & Ty Miller, Does Undocumented Immigration Increase 
Violent Crime?, CRIMINOLOGY, Mar. 2018, at 1, 24 (reporting, based on longitudinal study span-
ning the 1990–2014 period, that “findings suggest . . . undocumented immigration over this period 
is generally associated with decreasing violent crime”); Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the 
Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-myth-
immigrant-criminality-imprisonment-among-first-and-second-generation-young [https://perma.cc/
ZW44-HY86] (demonstrating that “immigrants have the lowest rates of imprisonment for criminal 
convictions in American society”). 
 45 Donald Trump Transcript: ‘Our Country Needs a Truly Great Leader,’ WALL STREET J. 
(June 16, 2015, 2:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/16/donald-trump-transcript-our-
country-needs-a-truly-great-leader [https://perma.cc/7KM7-A35A]. 
 46 Tara Golshan, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Speech Showed “Zero Tolerance” for Undoc-
umented Immigrants, VOX (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:27 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/31/12743880/
donald-trump-immigration-policy-speech-transcript [https://perma.cc/WL5J-M7K3]. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Full Text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC Draft Speech Transcript, POLITICO (July 21, 2016, 6:21 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-
speech-at-rnc-225974 [https://perma.cc/8CD9-7BEH]. Three parents of victims (Mary Ann Mendo-
za, Sabine Durden, and Jamiel Shaw) spoke on the first night of the nominating convention. Jessi-
ca Hopper, Family of People Killed by Undocumented Immigrants Speak Out at RNC, ABC NEWS 
(July 18, 2016, 10:32 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/family-people-killed-undocumented-
immigrants-speak-gop-convention/story?id=40685407 [https://perma.cc/6YJU-HR6Y]. 
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example of why we must secure our border immediately.”49 Notably, more 
than two years after the incident, on November 30, 2017, a San Francisco 
jury acquitted Jose Ines Garcia Zarate—the man accused of shooting 
Kathryn Steinle—of all homicide charges.50 
In carrying out the interior enforcement executive order, Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) officials perpetuated President Trump’s rhetoric of im-
migrant criminality. For example, former DHS Secretary John F. Kelly is-
sued an implementing memorandum declaring that “[c]riminal aliens rou-
tinely victimize Americans and other legal residents.”51 Attorney General 
Jefferson Sessions repeated the President’s assertion that “[c]ountless Amer-
icans would be alive today—and countless loved ones would not be griev-
ing today—if the policies of these sanctuary jurisdictions were ended.”52 
Invoking Kathryn Steinle’s death, and claiming that sanctuary policies “en-
danger the lives of every American” and “violate federal law,” Sessions 
vowed to implement the executive order by cutting funding to sanctuary 
jurisdictions.53 
Statements conflating immigration and crime have become a mainstay 
of the Trump presidency. In July 2017, President Trump told community 
members in Suffolk County, New York that undocumented immigrants who 
commit crimes of violence are “animals” that render cities “bloodstained 
killing fields . . . .”54 The Trump administration’s immigration plans have 
also highlighted the racial impacts of federal immigration enforcement poli-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Doug Stanglin, Trump: San Francisco Shooting Case for Securing Border, USA TODAY 
(July 4, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/07/04/donald-trump-
san-francisco-killing-whipping-post/29694403/ [https://perma.cc/CL7P-M8KL] (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  
 50 Holly Yan & Dan Simon, Undocumented Immigrant Acquitted in Kate Steinle Death, CNN 
(Dec. 1, 2017, 2:21 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/kate-steinle-murder-trial-verdict/index.
html [https://perma.cc/67H3-Y8AD] (reporting that President Trump called the verdict “disgrace-
ful” and that Attorney General Sessions blamed “San Franciso’s status as a sanctuary city” for 
Steinle’s death). 
 51 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAlaneen 
et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 4 (Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Kelly Immi-
gration Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-
of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/VYH3-QL39]. 
 52 Jefferson Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions 
(Mar. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Remarks], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-sanctuary-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/68YC-
YQ87]; see also POLITICO, supra note 2. 
 53 Sessions Remarks, supra note 52.  
 54 Maggie Haberman & Liz Robbins, Trump, on Long Island, Vows an End to Gang Violence, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/politics/trump-immigration-
gang-violence-long-island.html [https://perma.cc/5PKZ-XYMM]; see also Graham Lanktree, Trump 
Says Immigrant Gang Members ‘Slice and Dice’ Young, Beautiful Girls, NEWSWEEK (July 26, 2017), 
http://www.newsweek.com/trump-says-immigrant-gang-members-slice-and-dice-young-beautiful-
girls-642046 [https://perma.cc/L48E-8Z9N]. 
2018] Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” 1717 
cy. Consistent with candidate Trump’s statements connecting Mexican na-
tionals with crime,55 anti-immigrant rhetoric has become a core component 
of a vocal white supremacist movement supporting Trump’s deportation 
policies.56 
Within three months of Trump taking office, six jurisdictions filed law-
suits challenging his executive order’s anti-sanctuary provisions.57 On April 
25, 2017, a federal judge issued a nationwide injunction halting the execu-
tive order.58 Undeterred, in July 2017 the DOJ announced that local juris-
dictions that did not cooperate with federal immigration authorities would 
be denied their Byrne Justice Assistance Grants (“JAG”),59 a leading source 
of federal funding for state and local criminal justice systems.60 Several ju-
risdictions filed suit challenging this move by the DOJ.61 The Seventh Cir-
                                                                                                                           
 55 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.  
 56 Kristina M. Campbell, A Dry Hate: White Supremacy and Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric in the 
Humanitarian Crisis on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 1081 (2015). 
 57 See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Concerning Federal Executive Order 
13768, City of Richmond v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-01535-SK (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017); Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 3, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 
3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter S.F. Complaint]; Complaint for De-
claratory and Injunctive Relief, City of Chelsea v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10214-GAO (D. Mass. 
Feb. 8, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00497-
BAT (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2017); see also Lai & Lasch, supra note 9, at 557–62 (providing a 
more detailed examination of the current litigation surrounding anti-sanctuary defunding efforts). 
 58 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump (Santa Clara Preliminary Injunction), 250 F. Supp. 3d. 497, 
508 (N.D. Cal. 2017). On November 20, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Santa Clara and San Francisco and entered and order permanently enjoining Section 9(a) 
of the Executive Order. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). The case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 59 Welcome to BJA’s Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program, BU-
REAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE: OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://www.bja.gov/jag/ [https://perma.
cc/EG6D-FUKD]. 
 60 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General Sessions 
Announces Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assis-
tance Grant Programs (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter Sessions Press Release], https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-
byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/2BHF-62Q4] (requiring jurisdictions, in addition to certifying 
compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, to grant immigration authorities access to any detention facility 
to interview inmates about their immigration status and provide at least forty-eight hours advanced 
notice of the scheduled release date and time of any inmate to facilitate transfer of custody to 
ICE); see also McCormick, supra note 14, at 168–70 (discussing federal anti-sanctuary statutes, 
including 8 U.S.C. § 1373). 
 61 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 
F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-04701), 2018 WL 1156774; Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sessions, No. 3:17-cv-04642-MEJ 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, City of Chicago v. 
Sessions, No. 1:17-cv-05720 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 2:17-cv-03894 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017); see also Lai 
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cuit Court of Appeals upheld a nationwide preliminary injunction barring 
the DOJ from withholding JAG funds based on two of three of the DOJ’s 
immigration enforcement conditions.62 
The campaign to “crack down” on sanctuary cities has also had a legis-
lative component. In June 2017 the House of Representatives passed the No 
Sanctuary for Criminals Act, a law designed to punish resistant localities by 
withholding DOJ and DHS grant funds.63 And, in March 2018, the admin-
istration filed suit to stop the implementation of three California immigrant 
protective laws: SB 54 (the “California Values Act”), AB 450 (the “Immi-
grant Worker Protection Act”), and AB 103.64 Speaking about the lawsuit, 
Attorney General Sessions accused California of undermining the immigra-
tion system and promoting a “radical open borders agenda.”65 
The Trump administration’s rhetoric of immigrant criminality and ef-
forts to malign sanctuary jurisdictions have obstructed critical understandings 
of the roots of sanctuary city policies. Administration officials have not 
backed down, even threatening criminal arrests of city officials and retaliation 
by expending increased enforcement resources in sanctuary jurisdictions.66 In 
the next sections, we provide important background for the current debate 
about the role of local criminal justice actors in policing immigration.67 
                                                                                                                           
& Lasch, supra note 9, at 559–61 (discussing developments in litigation challenging the Byrne 
JAG funding conditions). 
 62 City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 1868327, at *18 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 
2018) (upholding District Court’s injunction as to access and notice conditions). See also City of 
Los Angeles v. Sessions, No. 17-7215-R, 2018 WL 1771184, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2018) 
(granting nationwide preliminary injunction preventing the DOJ from similarly disadvantaging 
localities that decline to participate in federal immigration enforcement in Community Oriented 
Policing Services (“COPS”) grants by awarding extra points for cooperation in scoring process). 
 63 No Sanctuary for Criminals Act, H.R. 3003, 115th Cong., § 2(a) (2017). Similar proposals 
have been introduced in earlier years; none have become law. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 9, at 
553 (cataloguing recent federal legislative proposals to target sanctuary jurisdictions). 
 64 Complaint at 7–16, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-00490 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 
2018); see also Carrie Johnson, Justice Department Sues California over Impending Immigration 
Enforcement, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 6, 2018, 9:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/06/
591301485/justice-department-sues-california-over-immigration-laws [https://perma.cc/9SW3-Y3W2]. 
 65 Thomas Fuller & Vivien Yee, Jeff Sessions Scolds California in Immigration Speech: ‘We 
Have a Problem,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/us/sessions-
california-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/V4B3-RRJ6]. 
 66 Acting ICE Director Wants Politicians in Charge of Sanctuary Cities Charged with Crimes, 
CBS NEWS (Jan. 3, 2018, 11:51 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/acting-ice-director-wants-
politicians-in-sanctuary-cities-charged-with-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/MU79-HN5E] (quoting acting 
ICE Director, Thomas Homan, as saying, in response to the effectuation of the California Values 
Act: “[t]hey’re about to see a lot more special agents, a lot more deportation hours in the state of 
California”). 
 67 See infra notes 68–165 and accompanying text. 
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B. Crimmigration’s Origins 
Over the past twenty years, local law enforcement agencies have in-
creasingly been pressed to engage in federal immigration enforcement ef-
forts. As we discuss, “crimmigration,” or the interweaving of immigration 
and criminal law, has led to the creation of interior immigration enforce-
ment policies that depend on the resources of local police and prosecutors to 
expand the arrest and detention of noncitizens.68 Understanding modern 
sanctuary policies thus first requires tracing how immigration came to be 
entangled with criminal law enforcement. 
For much of our country’s history since the late nineteenth century, 
immigration enforcement efforts were focused at the border and carried out 
almost exclusively by federal officials.69 U.S. Supreme Court cases also 
drew a distinction between the immigration system, which was civil in na-
ture, and criminal punishment.70 Together with cases limiting the ability of 
states to treat immigrants within their borders differently from citizens,71 
these precedents precluded states and localities from having any significant 
role in regulating the presence of noncitizens.72 States and localities gener-
                                                                                                                           
 68 This entanglement of local criminal law systems with immigration enforcement has been 
well documented by scholars as part of a growing phenomenon. Stumpf, supra note 31, at 376; see 
also, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Crimmigration at the Local Level: Criminal Jus-
tice Processes in the Shadow of Deportation, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 241, 245–46 (2015); Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 135–36 
(2009); Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594 
(2016); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1341–42 (2010); 
Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 126 (2013); César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1513; Bill 
Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79 
(1998); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Pe-
nology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 614–15 (2003); Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigra-
tion: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” World, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 644–46 (2015). 
 69 Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1885), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993) (analyzing state regulation of transborder movement of per-
sons prior to 1875 and concluding that it existed “primarily at the state level, but also supplement-
ed by federal legislation”). 
 70 See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that 
immigration proceedings, which determine “whether the conditions exist upon which congress has 
enacted that an alien . . . may remain within the country,” are civil in nature, and that “deportation 
is not a punishment for crime”); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local 
Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1571–78 (2008) (describing consolidation of 
immigration enforcement power in the federal government). 
 71 See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (striking down state 
laws conditioning welfare on U.S. citizenship and residency); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
374 (1886) (holding that San Francisco’s discriminatory application of a misdemeanor ordinance 
to Chinese residents violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 72 See Stumpf, supra note 70, at 1571–78. This doctrine of exclusive federal power over im-
migration concerns the relationship between the federal and state and local governments. It is not 
the same as the much-criticized “plenary power” doctrine, which addresses only the limits on 
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ally could not use immigration law to divest their noncitizen residents of 
membership.73 And criminal law was applied, at least formally, to all de-
fendants regardless of citizenship or immigration status. 
This division of responsibility between largely federal governance of 
immigration and state power to enforce criminal law began to shift in the 
1980s, when a fundamental reframing of the nature of immigration enforce-
ment upset these long-established roles.74 In the 1980s the Reagan admin-
istration’s “war on drugs” provided politicians with an opportunity to promote 
a myth of immigrant criminality that would ultimately lead to an unprece-
dented entanglement of immigration enforcement with the criminal justice 
goals.75 This conflation of immigrants with criminality paved the way for 
                                                                                                                           
federal power, holding that the federal government may exercise power in the immigration arena 
relatively unconstrained by constitutional norms such as equal protection. See MOTOMURA, supra 
note 6, at 113–71 (discussing federal, state, and local involvement in the enforcement of immigra-
tion laws and policies); Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: 
Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 18 n.88 (2013) (highlighting the 
various “intense scholarly criticism[s]” of the plenary power doctrine); Kevin R. Johnson, Immi-
gration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 
OKLA. L. REV. 57, 64 (2015) (concluding that modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has, without 
eliminating the plenary power doctrine, “silently moved away from anything that might be charac-
terized as immigration exceptionalism” and continued to “bring U.S. immigration law into the 
legal mainstream”); Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 27 (2015) (observing that “immigration law scholars have 
been predicting the imminent demise of the plenary power doctrine for at least three decades”); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the 
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 934 (1995) (predicting that “[l]ittle by little, exceptions 
and qualifications will reduce the doctrine to a shadow of its former self without an express over-
ruling of contrary precedent”). 
 73 See Stumpf, supra note 70, at 1557–58. 
 74 A burgeoning scholarship has traced these developments in the intermeshing of immigra-
tion and criminal law and enforcement. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immi-
gration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1835–49 
(2007); Eagly, supra note 68; Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic 
Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 
650–55 (2004); Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 879, 882–88 
(2015); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471–73 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring 
the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 81, 86–95 (2005); Stumpf, supra note 31. 
 75 César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1346, 1360 (2014) (tracing the historical impact of the war on drugs on immigrant detention 
and positing that “the concerns that led Congress to prosecute the nascent ‘war on drugs’ were 
intertwined with concerns that immigrants were bringing the scourge of drug use and drug traf-
ficking into cities across the country”); Vázquez, supra note 68, at 641–42 (describing the crimi-
nalization of immigrants as a spillover effect of war on drugs); see also Peter Andreas, Redrawing 
the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century, 28 INT’L SECURITY 78, 87 (2003) 
(describing the “narcoticized” southern border); Miller, supra note 68, at 626 (describing the no-
tion of the “U.S. border as a ‘crime scene’”).  
2018] Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” 1721 
local law enforcement participation in policing immigration.76 The narrative 
of immigrants-as-criminals made it appear more natural for local law en-
forcement to become involved in immigration enforcement.77 
As low-level drug crime became a national obsession, criminal arrests 
were converted into a gateway for deportation. This transformation of local 
criminal law enforcement missions was buttressed by changes in the immi-
gration law, which attached the consequences of deportation to even low-
level drug offenses. For example, in 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act, which provided—in Subtitle M, the Narcotics Traffickers De-
portation Act—for the exclusion or deportation of virtually all immigrants 
who commit controlled substance offenses.78 
In 1996, Congress took a bold step in the direction of merging federal 
immigration enforcement and local criminal enforcement by creating the 
287(g) program.79 The 287(g) program provides for voluntary partnerships 
in which local officers are deputized to perform certain immigration en-
                                                                                                                           
 76 Leo Chavez has argued that this immigrant “threat narrative” was constructed and replen-
ished over the course of a century. See Leo R. Chavez, “Illegality” Across Generations: Public 
Discourse and the Children of Undocumented Immigrants, in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT “ILLE-
GALITY”: CRITIQUES, EXPERIENCES, AND RESPONSES 84, 86 (Cecilia Menjívar & Daniel Kan-
stroom eds., 2014) (describing Latino threat narrative “which posits that Latinos, led by Mexicans 
and Mexican Americans, are unwilling to integrate socially, unwilling to learn English and U.S. 
culture, and preparing for a take over [of] the Southwest of the United States”). Nicholas De Ge-
nova provides an excellent account of the shifting legal responses to—or embodiments of—this 
threat narrative. Nicholas De Genova, Immigration “Reform” and the Production of Migrant 
“Illegality,” in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT “ILLEGALITY,” supra, at 37, 39–58; see also GERALD 
P. LÓPEZ, UNDOCUMENTED MEXICAN MIGRATION: IN SEARCH OF A JUST IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND POLICY (1981) (tracing the history of undocumented Mexican migration to the United 
States); Gyung-Ho Jeong et al., Cracks in the Opposition: Immigration as a Wedge Issue for the 
Reagan Coalition, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 511, 514–15 (2011) (describing evolution of immigration 
from an economic issue to a social issue). 
 77 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incar-
ceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1036, 1037 n.62 (2010) (noting that 
“fighting crime became a seemingly ‘obvious’ framework for responding to social problems,” 
including unauthorized immigration). 
 78 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 1751, 100 Stat. 3207-47 to -48 
(amending what is known today as the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012) and § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)). In introducing the A”nti-Drug Abuse Act, the legislators relied explicitly on 
the alleged connection between immigration and crime. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H6716-03 (daily 
ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Often, those dealing drugs have entered this coun-
try illegally and show absolutely no fear of United States law. . . . My amendment will help to 
alleviate this problem. It serves to enhance the performance of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service’s Investigative Branch in its battle against illegal aliens who use our streets to peddle 
death.”). 
 79 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208 § 133, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)). For a thoughtful 
discussion of 287(g) and other related programs, see Gerald P. López, Don’t We Like Them Ille-
gal?, 45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1782–90 (2012). 
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forcement functions under federal supervision.80 At the same time, the im-
migration system expanded its reliance on detention and other tools that had 
traditionally been associated with criminal law enforcement.81 In addition, 
immigration enforcement during this time period began to coincide increas-
ingly with criminal prosecution of immigrants for illegal entry and 
reentry.82 
The push to involve local police in federal immigration enforcement 
intensified after the September 11th terrorist attacks.83 In 2002, the DOJ 
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) issued an opinion stating that local law 
enforcement had “inherent authority” to enforce federal immigration laws, 
reversing a longstanding view that local police did not have the authority to 
make civil immigration arrests.84 Immigration restrictionists supported this 
pro-enforcement policy change, arguing that that local police could play a 
valuable role as a “force multiplier” in the federal immigration enforcement 
effort.85 
States and localities reacted in varied ways. Some local jurisdictions 
rushed to participate in the 287(g) program. A number of states and locali-
                                                                                                                           
 80 López, supra note 79, at 1782–90. 
 81 See, e.g., García Hernández, supra note 75, at 1372–77 (characterizing detention as exam-
ple of “penal norms” in immigration enforcement); Stumpf, supra note 31, at 386–91 (arguing that 
“[i]mmigration enforcement has come to parallel criminal law enforcement”). 
 82 See Eagly, supra note 68, at 1352–53 (tracking the steady rise in immigration crime prose-
cution from 1923 to the present era); David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc 
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 166–75 (2012) (describing rise in illegal entry and 
reentry prosecutions of immigration crimes since 1996). 
 83 See generally Anil Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After September 11, 
2001, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 181 (Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008) (detailing efforts to 
enlist local law enforcement in federal immigration enforcement efforts after 9/11); Leisy Abrego 
et al., Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Processes of Criminalization in the Post-IIRIRA 
Era, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 694 (2017) (discussing the legislative changes that 
paved the way for intensified criminalization of migrants after 9/11); Jennifer M. Chacón, supra 
note 74, at 1831 (describing “blurred boundaries” between immigration, crime, and national secu-
rity control after 9/11); Gallya Lahav & Marie Courtemanche, The Ideological Effects of Framing 
Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties, 34 POL. BEHAV. 477, 478 (2012) (discussing a “secu-
ritization of migration discourse” after 9/11) (internal quotation marks omitted); Miller, supra note 
74, at 87–88 (describing post-9/11 allocation of crime-control resources to immigration control).  
 84 Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, to Omar Jadwat, Esq., ACLU Immigrants’ 
Rights Project 9–10, 14–15 (July 22, 2005), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/olc-memo-state-
and-local-law-enforcement-immigration-laws [https://perma.cc/GJ9W-DQ8T]. 
 85 See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of 
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181, 199–201 (2005) (proposing 
relying on criminal justice actors to vastly expand deportation and arguing that states have inher-
ent authority to make immigration arrests deriving from state sovereign power); Peter H. Schuck, 
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 85–91 (concluding that 
state immigration laws are not preempted when they align with federal goals). 
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ties also passed their own restrictionist immigration measures,86 many of 
which were premised on the association of immigrants with criminality.87 
As discussed in more detail in Part II, other jurisdictions resisted the push to 
entangle their local criminal justice systems,88 maintaining instead that fed-
eral immigration enforcement is not the job of state and local law enforce-
ment officials.89 These policies—implemented in response to federal pres-
sure—are now frequently labeled sanctuary policies. 
C. Crimmigration’s Enforcement Mechanisms 
Central to the entanglement of local government resources with federal 
immigration policy are a core set of federal programs that put state and mu-
nicipal law enforcement in the service of federal immigration enforcement 
goals. Each of these programs has inspired sustained legal and political con-
troversy. Each has been given new life under the current administration. 
This section introduces the principal federal enforcement mechanisms 
that play starring roles in the Trump administration’s crimmigration regime: 
the Criminal Alien Program, 287(g) agreements, ICE administrative war-
rants, the Secure Communities Program, and joint operations with local law 
enforcement. Understanding how these programs function and their resur-
                                                                                                                           
 86 As Linus Chan has explained, the purpose of some of these laws was to create a hostile 
environment that would cause immigrants to self-deport. See R. Linus Chan, The Right to Travel: 
Breaking Down the Thousand Petty Fortresses of State Self-Deportation Laws, 34 PACE L. REV. 
814, 816 (2014). 
 87 See, e.g., Jamie G. Longazel, Rhetorical Barriers to Mobilizing for Immigrant Rights: 
White Innocence and Latina/o Abstraction, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 580, 585–86 (2014) (dis-
cussing how Hazleton, Pennsylvania enacted restrictionist legislation in response to the construc-
tion of “an artificial and highly racialized crime wave”). Local enforcement of federal immigration 
law did not slow until the Supreme Court struck down most of Arizona’s immigrant policing law 
and limited the nonfederal role in immigration enforcement. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 
387, 410 (2012) (“Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may not make war-
rantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited circumstanc-
es.”); see also id. at 413 (noting that detention of individuals by local law enforcement “solely to 
verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns”). 
 88 See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text; see also Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 600–
05 (describing sanctuary laws and arguing that many serve “as direct legislative and administra-
tive responses to the federal government’s expanding efforts to enlist state and local police volun-
tarily in the enforcement of immigration laws”). 
 89 See generally MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 113–44 (examining the role of state and local 
governments in both enforcing immigration laws and integrating unauthorized migrants); Huyen 
Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 968 (2004) (suggesting 
that state and local involvement in the enforcement of immigration laws raised constitutional con-
cerns); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1084, 1088 (2004) (discussing the increasing involvement of local officials in the en-
forcement of immigration laws and the risk of “racial profiling and selective enforcement”). 
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gence under the current administration is critical to later understanding the 
sanctuary policies that we introduce in Part II.90 
1. The Criminal Alien Program 
The stated purpose of the Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”) is to iden-
tify, arrest, and deport “priority” noncitizens encountered in federal, state, 
and local prisons and jails.91 Created in the 1980s, the program places ICE 
agents in participating local jails to identify individuals for deportation.92 In 
conducting their work within the local jails, ICE agents may search bio-
metric and biographic data, as well as interview arrestees and inmates.93 In 
the period between 2004 and 2015, CAP was associated with at least 
1,435,000 immigration arrests.94 
CAP has triggered two key concerns. First, several researchers have 
provided evidence that CAP is associated with racial profiling practices by 
police. In a study conducted on the program’s implementation in Irving, 
Texas, CAP was associated with increased arrests of Latinos for minor of-
fenses.95 Second, although CAP was purportedly designed to go after seri-
ous criminals, research suggests that individuals without criminal records, 
or only minor convictions, were also targeted.96 Indeed, documents obtained 
from ICE in response to a Freedom of Information Act request revealed that 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Immigration Enforcement: Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS EN-
FORCEMENT (2018) [hereinafter Criminal Alien Program], https://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-
program [https://perma.cc/N2SH-DW5C]. CAP also pursues noncitizens who are not currently 
incarcerated but may meet the criminal removal grounds. Id. 
 92 See WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCE-
MENT: CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAMS, app. B at 23 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R44627.pdf [https://perma.cc/89E2-4BUL]. 
 93 Id. at 10. 
 94 Id. at 15 (listing number of arrests from CAP program for each year for which data was 
available from 2004 to 2015). 
 95 TREVOR GARDNER II & AARTI KOHLI, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETH-
NICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PRO-
GRAM (Sept. 2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_0909_v9.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E75N-M5QA] (documenting a correlation between the introduction of CAP in a local 
jail in Irving, Texas and the profiling of Latinos); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in 
the War on Drugs Meets the Immigration Removal Process: The Case of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 48 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967, 968–69 (2015) (observing that the “group of noncitizens subject to 
removal tends to be racially skewed,” in part, because it reflects racially disparate impacts of the 
criminal justice system). 
 96 See, e.g., GARDNER & KOHLI, supra note 95, at 4 (describing the incentive of local officers 
under the CAP program to make arrests for petty offenses, which would then lead to deportation). 
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seventy-nine percent of immigrants targeted by CAP had either no criminal 
record at all, or convictions for only traffic or minor offenses.97 
The Trump administration has made clear that it plans to rely heavily 
on CAP to deport noncitizens.98 According to the agency’s current website, 
immigrants identified through the program will be treated as a priority for 
deportation action.99 In addition, the agency pledges to use CAP to identify 
immigrants to be “aggressive[ly] prosecut[ed]” by federal prosecutors for 
violations of criminal immigration laws.100 
2. The 287(g) Program 
In 1996, Congress enacted section 287(g) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (“INA”), which grants DHS the ability to enter into agree-
ments with local law enforcement agencies to engage in immigration en-
forcement.101 Pursuant to these optional written agreements, nonfederal of-
ficers receive training at local expense to carry out certain immigration en-
forcement functions, such as arrests and detention, to the extent consistent 
with state and local law.102 The 1996 statute specifies that DHS must super-
vise the deputized officers and must also require, as a condition of the writ-
ten agreement, that the deputized officers know and adhere to federal law 
regarding the federal function they are fulfilling.103 The 287(g) program has 
a “task force model,” applying to street-level policing, and a “jail model,” 
                                                                                                                           
 97 NAT’L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK ET AL., BRIEFING GUIDE TO “SECURE COMMUNI-
TIES”—ICE’S CONTROVERSIAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM NEW STATISTICS AND 
INFORMATION REVEAL DISTURBING TRENDS AND LEAVE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS UNANSWERED 1–
4 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter NDLON BRIEFING GUIDE], https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/
assets/files/Secure%20Communities%20Fact%20Sheet%20Briefing%20guide%208-2-2010%20
Production.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5H8-P9GJ]; see also NYU SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 
CLINIC ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES, DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY 10 (July 2012), http://www.
immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NYC-FOIA-Report-2012-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZBK-9KJV] (finding that 37% of noncitizens taken into custody through CAP 
had no criminal history). 
 98 See Kelly Immigration Memo, supra note 51, at 3. 
 99 Criminal Alien Program, supra note 91. See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecution of 
Immigration Crime in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with 
authors) (outlining the Trump administration’s policy agenda to prosecute immigrants and refu-
gees for crossing the border). 
 100 Criminal Alien Program, supra note 91.  
 101 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 
sec. 133, § 287(g), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)). 
 102 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1), (3). 
 103 Id. § 1357(g)(2). 
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which is mostly concerned with identifying and transferring inmates from 
local to immigration custody.104 
The 287(g) program was widely criticized for fostering civil rights viola-
tions and failing to conform to federal enforcement priorities. In March 2010 
the DHS Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) reviewed the program and 
found, among other things, that ICE officers provided insufficient supervi-
sion, failed to consider a jurisdiction’s civil rights record before entering into 
a 287(g) agreement, and improperly implemented local immigration policies 
rather than federal priorities.105 In 2011, a DOJ investigation concluded that 
the 287(g) program in Maricopa County, Arizona “created a ‘wall of distrust’ 
between officers and Maricopa County’s Latino residents . . . that has signifi-
cantly compromised” community safety.106 Among other practices, the inves-
tigation revealed evidence of racial profiling of Latino drivers and the initia-
tion of immigration enforcement in response to “complaints that described no 
criminal activity, but rather referred . . . to individuals with ‘dark skin’ con-
gregating in one area, or individuals speaking Spanish . . . .”107 
In the wake of this controversy, the Obama administration announced 
in 2012 that it would stop renewing any 287(g) task force agreements.108 
The number of agreements under the program dropped by half,109 leaving in 
                                                                                                                           
 104 The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-immigration [https://perma.cc/VU5V-
2T4F]. A third “hybrid” model, which combines elements of both, has not been frequently used. Id. 
 105 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-10-63, THE PERFOR-
MANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS 8–34 (Mar. 2010) [hereinafter OIG 287(G) REPORT], https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QHA-H83L]; see also 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER 
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FED-
ERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7U7R-SPTX]. 
 106 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill 
Montgomery, Cty. Attorney, Maricopa Cty., Ariz. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/H87L-UT9M]. 
 107 Id. at 2–3. An investigation into the 287(g) program of Alamance County, North Carolina 
revealed similarly disturbing evidence of racial profiling. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Clyde B. Albright, Cty. Attorney, Alamance Cty., N.C. & 
Chuck Kitchen, Attorney, Turrentine Law Firm 5 (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/resources/171201291812462488198.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6D-EYV8] (describing dis-
criminatory traffic enforcement and checkpoint practices). 
 108 See John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Statement Regarding a Hear-
ing on “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request” Before 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations and Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security 13 (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=38896&linkid=244
574 [https://perma.cc/9R22-JHM5] (announcing that “ICE will begin by discontinuing the least 
productive 287(g) task force agreements . . . and will also suspend consideration of any requests 
for new 287(g) agreements”). 
 109 News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End 
Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guide-
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place only thirty-four section 287(g) agreements at the end of the admin-
istration.110 All agreements were limited to officers providing jail support, 
rather than authorizing the kind of “task force” immigration policing in 
community settings that the Arizona abuses typified.111 
The 287(g) program has been linked to racial profiling and distrust in 
local law enforcement. Amada Armenta’s insightful study of the Metropoli-
tan Nashville Police Department’s participation in a 287(g) program under-
scores this concern. Through two years of field work, Armenta found that 
the enforcement of immigration law through a 287(g) program in the county 
jail undermined the Latino community’s trust in the police on the street.112 
The jail program also empowered some officers to be “unnecessarily puni-
tive” and seek out and arrest Latino immigrants, a decision that could result 
in their deportation.113 
President Trump campaigned on a promise to revive the 287(g) pro-
gram.114 Signaling a definitive shift in direction, President Trump’s execu-
tive order on interior enforcement directed DHS to pursue 287(g) agree-
ments “to the maximum extent permitted by law.”115 Since he took office, 
the number of 287(g) agreements has nearly doubled.116 Eighteen of these 
additional agreements are in Texas.117 
                                                                                                                           
lines to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221
washingtondc2.htm [https://perma.cc/6NHP-UDCS] (announcing that “ICE has . . . decided not to 
renew any of its agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies that operate task forces 
under the 287(g) program”). 
 110 Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (2018) [hereinafter 287(g) Fact Sheet], https://www.ice.gov/
factsheets/287g [https://perma.cc/PB6Y-ZJMQ]. 
 111 See, e.g., OIG 287(G) REPORT, supra note 105, at 9 (expressing concern that ICE lacked 
assurance that the 287(g) program was meeting its intended purpose to target “aliens who pose the 
greatest risk to public safety and the community”). 
 112 Amada Armenta, Between Public Service and Social Control: Policing Dilemmas in the 
Era of Immigration Enforcement, 63 SOC. PROBS. 111, 114–23 (2016) [hereinafter Armenta, Be-
tween Public Service and Social Control] (studying the implementation of 287(g) in Nashville, 
Tennessee). See generally AMADA ARMENTA, PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE OF 
POLICIING AS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2017) (finding that a 287(g) agreement at a Nash-
ville, Tennessee jail from 2007–2012 most negatively affected immigrants arrested for minor 
infractions, and consequently undermined the community’s trust in local police authority). 
 113 Armenta, Between Public Service and Social Control, supra note 112, at 119–22. 
 114 See POLITICO, supra note 2 (“We will expand and revitalize the popular 287(g) partner-
ships, which will help to identify hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens in local jails.”). 
 115 Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8800 (calling on DHS to enter into 
287(g) agreements with local governments). 
 116 287(g) Fact Sheet, supra note 110 (noting that there were sixty-one 287(g) agreements as 
of August 27, 2017). All are “jail enforcement” agreements. Id. 
 117 News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, ICE Announces 18 New 287(g) 
Agreements in Texas (July 31, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-announces-18-new-
287g-agreements-texas [https://perma.cc/EYL8-CMFW] (noting that each of the new 287(g) 
agreements operate under a jail enforcement model).  
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3. ICE Administrative Warrants 
As noted earlier, after the September 11th attacks, the OLC issued a 
memorandum reversing its view that local law enforcement had no “inher-
ent authority” to enforce federal civil immigration law.118 This threw open 
the door to immigration arrests by nonfederal officers even without a 287(g) 
agreement. Based on the OLC’s conclusion that local law enforcement did 
have such authority, the federal government began to enter thousands of 
records—relating to persons that immigration authorities believed had ig-
nored a removal order or not complied with a requirement of the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”)—into the FBI’s Na-
tional Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database.119 These records were 
added to an NCIC file called the Immigration Violators File (“IVF”).120 
Previously, the IVF contained only records of individuals with felony con-
victions who had unlawfully re-entered the United States following a prior 
deportation.121 
Once the FBI started putting a large number of civil immigration rec-
ords into the NCIC database, local law enforcement agencies began detain-
ing individuals they encountered who had a “hit” in the database, which 
would typically appear in the database as an arrest warrant.122 Nevertheless, 
unlike criminal arrest warrants, these ICE administrative arrest warrants are 
issued by an immigration officer, not a judge.123 In addition, these adminis-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 119 HANNAH GLADSTEIN ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., BLURRING THE LINES: A PROFILE 
OF STATE AND LOCAL POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW USING THE NATIONAL 
CRIME INFORMATION CENTER DATABASE, 2002–2004, at 7 (Dec. 2005), https://www.migration
policy.org/pubs/MPI_report_Blurring_the_Lines_120805.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2FW-HGEZ]. The 
NCIC is a system used by law enforcement agencies to exchange criminal history information and 
identify individuals with outstanding wants and warrants. Id. at 3. NSEERS is a program that was 
created after September 11th that required certain people—largely males from majority Arab and 
Muslim nations—to report for registration and fingerprinting. Id.; see J. David Goodman & Ron 
Nixon, Obama to Dismantle Visitor Registry Before Trump Can Revive It, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/nyregion/obama-to-dismantle-visitor-registry-before-
trump-can-revive-it.html [https://perma.cc/S5M6-2EEA] (discussing current status of NSEERS 
program). 
 120 GLADSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 3. 
 121 Id. at 6–7. 
 122 See D.C. Metro. Police Exec. Order No. 17-010, Administrative Warrants in NCIC (Mar. 24, 
2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=38629549 [https://perma.cc/42JF-M2UQ] 
(illustrating the difference between an NCIC response concerning an ICE administrative warrant 
and a criminal warrant). 
 123 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2017) (authorizing various immigration enforcement officers to 
issue arrest warrants); see also El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 276 
(D. Conn. 2008) (noting that administrative immigration warrant “was signed by . . . an ICE Agent 
intimately involved in the investigation” and “[n]o neutral magistrate (or even a neutral executive 
official) ever examined the warrant’s validity”). 
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trative warrants are issued not upon probable cause of a crime—the “usual 
predicate” for arrest by local law enforcement124—but instead upon proba-
ble cause of removability.125  
In 2012, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court put an end to 
the “inherent authority” theory for local enforcement of immigration law, 
clarifying that local law enforcement officials could not arrest or detain 
noncitizens based only on suspected removability except in very limited 
circumstances.126 After Arizona, it was clear that local law enforcement had 
no legal basis to hold persons based only on an administrative warrant.127 
Compounding the problem for localities was the reality that the immigration 
records entered into the NCIC are often unreliable.128 
Today, ICE administrative warrants remain in the NCIC database. 
They also sometimes accompany immigration detainers.129 Because admin-
istrative warrants and detainers are often issued in reliance on informational 
databases, concerns over their accuracy and expansion are especially sali-
ent. As Anil Kahlan writes, these databases are accessible by a “large num-
ber of actors,” which can often result not only in errors, but extreme diffi-
culty in correcting such errors.130 Kalhan also warns of the tendency of the 
use of the databases to “morph[]” into an ever-increasing surveillance by 
the government.131 
                                                                                                                           
 124 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407. 
 125 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-200, WARRANT FOR ARREST OF ALIEN (2016) 
[hereinafter FORM I-200 WARRANT], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/
2017/I-200_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/YX4Q-M2Q6] (reciting probable cause of remova-
bility). 
 126 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410, 455. 
 127 WENDY WAYNE & ANTHONY J. BENEDETTI, MASS. COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS., 
IMMIGRATION IMPACT UNIT, A PRACTICE ADVISORY ON ICE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTS 
AND TRUE WARRANTS IN IMMIGRATION AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (Feb. 19, 2013), https://
www.publiccounsel.net/iiu/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/2014/07/ICE-Warrants-Practice-Advisory.
pdf [https://perma.cc/U865-GHME]. 
 128 GLADSTEIN ET AL., supra note 119, at 12–13 (noting that ICE was unable to confirm an 
immigration violation following a hit in the database in 42% of cases from 2002 to 2004). 
 129 In an attempt to address a federal court decision that held ICE routinely exceeded the ar-
rest authority granted to it by the INA, ICE enacted a policy requiring detainers to be accompanied 
by administrative warrants. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, POLICY NO. 10074.2: ISSU-
ANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS ¶ 2.4 & n.2 (Mar. 24, 2017) 
[hereinafter ICE POLICY 10074.2], https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/
2017/10074-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UW8-DR8Q] (citing Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 
999, 1008–09 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). 
 130 Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 73 (2014); see also Margaret 
Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1785 (2015) (setting out the underlying basis for 
errors in government screening databases and the consequences of such errors). 
 131 Kalhan, supra note 130, at 77–78. 
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4. The Secure Communities Program 
In 2008 the federal government undertook another far-reaching effort 
to harness state and local criminal justice systems for federal immigration 
enforcement by activating the Secure Communities program. Secure Com-
munities created an automatic information-sharing system that allowed 
DHS to engage in immigration enforcement by using the biometric data 
collected by local police and sheriffs. Once Secure Communities was acti-
vated across the country, the fingerprints of every person that state and local 
officials booked into custody were forwarded automatically from the FBI to 
DHS.132 
Although the transmission of fingerprint data opened up local jails to 
DHS for the purposes of identifying enforcement targets, it was still neces-
sary for DHS to take custody of its targets. For this, immigration officials 
relied on immigration “detainers,” which take the form of a piece of paper 
faxed or emailed from federal immigration officials to local officials.133 The 
paper form used for detainers when the program began contained language 
suggesting compliance was mandatory, stating that federal regulations “re-
quire that you detain the alien.”134 
The detainer form caused confusion about whether detainers were vol-
untary requests or mandatory commands to local officials.135 This confusion 
was further perpetuated by DHS’s actions that suggested to jurisdictions 
that they could not “opt out” of participating in Secure Communities. Ini-
tially, DHS suggested that jurisdictions could stop fingerprints submitted for 
                                                                                                                           
 132 Secure Communities: FAQs, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.
gov/secure-communities (select “What Is Secure Communities?” subheading) [https://perma.cc/
4XEY-4AB5] (explaining that “[u]nder Secure Communities, the FBI automatically sends finger-
prints to DHS to check against the immigration databases. If these checks reveal that an individual 
is unlawfully present in the United States or otherwise removable, ICE takes enforcement ac-
tion”). 
 133 Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:16-cv-02457-SEB-TAB, 2017 WL 
5634965, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 7, 2017) (citing Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration De-
tainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 634 (2013)). 
 134 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM I-247 IM-
MIGRATION DETAINER—NOTICE OF ACTION (1997), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/
immigrantjustice.org/files/Detainer%20Form%20(April%201997)%20(Clean).pdf [https://perma.
cc/72TR-NEQA] (stating that “[f]ederal regulations (8 CFR 287.7) require that you detain the 
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays) to 
provide adequate time for INS to assume custody of the alien”). 
 135 DHS perpetuated this misunderstanding through various iterations of the detainer form. 
See generally Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 205–09 (2013) 
(discussing the uncertainty surrounding the commanding or voluntary nature of an immigration 
detainer by analyzing different iterations of the form). 
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FBI checks from being transmitted to DHS.136 When local communities 
tried to prevent the transmittal of fingerprints, however, they were told that 
participation in the program was mandatory.137 
Secure Communities pushed nonfederal criminal justice officials to the 
front line of immigration enforcement in two ways. First, because any arrest 
could open the door to deportation, an encounter between a noncitizen and a 
police officer became a de facto brush with immigration enforcement.138 
Second, Secure Communities relied on police and sheriffs to hold nonciti-
zens beyond their normal release. And because detainers were issued upon 
arrest (rather than conviction), Secure Communities regularly failed to meet 
its stated purpose of reducing crime rates,139 often ensnaring noncitizens 
with no criminal conviction at all.140 
Even before the Trump administration added Secure Communities to 
its toolbox, the program had attracted a litany of critiques leading the prior 
administration to abandon it. Although billed as making no change to the 
operation of local law enforcement agencies, Secure Communities did in 
effect turn local law enforcement officers into immigration agents. Secure 
Communities therefore exacerbated divisions between the police and local 
communities, making immigrant communities afraid to come into contact 
with the police.141 In addition, Secure Communities was critiqued as en-
                                                                                                                           
 136 M. Alex Johnson, Cities, Counties Can’t Stop Federal Immigration Checks, NBC NEWS 
(Oct. 15, 2010, 6:13 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39576754/ns/us_news-security/t/cities-
counties-cant-stop-federal-immigration-checks/#.WsuqdkxFx-M [https://perma.cc/4N8E-VF3W] 
(discussing ICE documents that portrayed participation in Secure Communities as being contin-
gent on a statement of intent by county and local governments).  
 137 See Stumpf, supra note 25, at 1272–73; Secure Communities: FAQ, supra note 132 (fol-
low “Can a State or Local Law Enforcement Agency Choose Not to Have Fingerprints It Submits 
to the FBI Checked Against DHS’s System?” subheading) (stating that “state and local jurisdic-
tions cannot prohibit information-sharing” under Secure Communities). 
 138 See MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 128–31 (discussing how the discretion and influence of 
local authorities in conducting arrests ties into immigration enforcement); Ingrid V. Eagly, Crimi-
nal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1126, 1148–49, 1212–15 (2013) (describing the mechanics of Secure Communities and observing 
that a locality’s model of noncitizen justice can vastly affect federal immigration enforcement 
outcomes); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015) (describing how ar-
rests now lead to a range of consequences, including deportation). 
 139 Elina Treyger et al., Immigration Enforcement, Policing, and Crime: Evidence from the 
Secure Communities Program, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 285 (2014) (concluding that there 
was no significant change in crime rates after the implementation of Secure Communities). 
 140 See, e.g., NDLON BRIEFING GUIDE, supra note 97; TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, FEW ICE DETAINERS TARGET SERIOUS CRIMINALS (Sept. 2013), http://trac.syr.
edu/immigration/reports/330 [https://perma.cc/8GFH-EX5E] (reporting that 47.7% of those sub-
ject to immigration detainers over a sixteen-month period had no criminal conviction at all). 
 141 See NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVE-
MENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 5–17 (May 2013), https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/up
loads/2014/05/Insecure_Communities_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARA5-A5C2] (report-
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couraging race-based policing.142 Finally, despite federal claims that Secure 
Communities made communities safer, a study of its implementation found 
that it had no impact on crime rates.143 
In addition to policy-based critiques, a series of judicial decisions also 
raised legal questions about the use of immigration detainers.144 In 2014, in 
Galarza v. Szalczyk, the Third Circuit held the County of Lehigh, Pennsyl-
vania liable for violating the Fourth Amendment rights of Ernesto Galarza, 
a U.S. citizen improperly targeted by immigration officials and held by the 
County pursuant to an immigration detainer.145 
Galarza and subsequent decisions made clear that local authorities 
could not be required by federal authorities to honor ICE detainer requests: 
compliance was voluntary.146 Those decisions also made clear that localities 
that detained individuals based on ICE detainers exposed themselves to lia-
bility for illegally detaining individuals without a judicial warrant or proba-
ble cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.147 These and other con-
cerns inspired many localities to decline to participate in the Secure Com-
munities program and to enact local policies limiting their compliance with 
immigration detainers.148 
                                                                                                                           
ing on the impact of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos’ perceptions of pub-
lic safety and their willingness to contact the police). 
 142 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The Racially 
Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993 (2016); Vázquez, 
supra note 68. A 2014 study of the Secure Communities program found no significant impact on 
arrest rates by ethnicity, although the authors did discuss the obstacles to disaggregating arrest 
rates of whites and Latinos. Treyger et al., supra note 139, at 306–08. 
 143 See Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? 
Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937, 970 (2014) (finding that the Secure 
Communities program has no observable effect on the “overall rate of FBI index crime calls”). 
 144 See Stumpf, supra note 25, at 1279–81. 
 145 Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 146 Galarza, 745 F. 3d at 639–45; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–
ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4–*8 (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2014) (relying on Galarza and other authorities 
in rejecting the notion that local officers’ compliance with immigration detainers is mandatory); 
see also Mercado v. Dall. Cty., 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 514–15 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (collecting cases, 
and rejecting Dallas County’s argument that holding individuals based on immigration detainers 
was required by federal law), abrogated on other grounds by City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F. 
3d 332, 356 n.21 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 147 See, e.g., Galarza, 745 F.3d at 640–42, 645 (concluding the detainer was a request to 
states and localities rather than an order, opening the door to municipal liability for unlawfully 
detaining a U.S. citizen); Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (county’s reliance on an 
ICE detainer to hold a noncitizen for two weeks violated the Fourth Amendment); Morales v. 
Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D.R.I. 2014) (immigration detainer issued “for purposes of 
mere investigation” is impermissible). 
 148 A state judge in Miami-Dade County recently held that even voluntary compliance with 
immigration detainers violated the Tenth Amendment when it was the result of the threat of fund-
ing cuts expressed in the Executive Order. Lacroix v. Junior, No. F201700376, 2017 WL 
1037454, at *6–*7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017). 
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In 2014, noting “the increasing number of federal court decisions that 
hold that detainer-based detention by state and local law enforcement agen-
cies violates the Fourth Amendment,” DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson an-
nounced that the “Secure Communities program, as we know it, will be dis-
continued.”149 The program was immediately replaced with a different pro-
gram, the Priority Enforcement Program (“PEP”).150 PEP’s most significant 
innovation was a modification of the detainer policy in effect under Secure 
Communities. Under PEP, the federal government often requested that local 
law enforcement notify ICE about the release of potentially deportable 
noncitizens rather than hold individuals past their release date.151 
The Trump administration has reversed course by terminating PEP.152 
In its place, President Trump has revived the defunct Secure Communities 
program, which he characterizes as a “[g]ood program.”153 As part of this 
transition back to Secure Communities, the Trump administration will place 
detainers on all immigrants who are arrested, regardless of the reason for 
arrest or the seriousness of any suspected conduct.154 
                                                                                                                           
 149 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to Thomas S. Win-
kowski et al., Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t 1 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Secure 
Communities Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_
communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ZT-9UNG] (“Governors, mayors, and state and local law 
enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, 
and many have issued executive orders or signed laws prohibiting” police entanglement with Se-
cure Communities). 
 150 Id. at 1–3 (announcing the establishment of PEP). See generally Stumpf, supra note 25 
(discussing the transition from Secure Communities to PEP). 
 151 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 149, at 2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
FORM I-247N REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF RELEASE OF SUSPECTED PRIORITY 
ALIEN, https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/I-247N.PDF [https://
perma.cc/EB89-ACWY]. Although PEP was associated with an overall decrease in the number of 
detainers issued, the wholesale replacement of requests for detention with requests for notification 
did not take place. For example, from July through November 2015 only about 17.4% of federal 
actions to obtain custody were requests for notification only. Moreover, requests for notification 
were concentrated in jurisdictions that had already stopped holding individuals on detainers in part 
or in whole under Secure Communities. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
LATEST DATA: IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DETAINERS (2017), http://trac.syr.
edu/phptools/immigration/detain/ [https://perma.cc/R2CJ-G76D]. 
 152 Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8801 (“The Secretary shall imme-
diately take all appropriate action to terminate the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) described 
in the memorandum issued by the Secretary on November 20, 2014 . . . .”). 
 153 Golshan, supra note 46 (“We will restore the highly successful Secure Communities pro-
gram. Good program.”); see also Interior Enforcement Executive Order, supra note 3, at 8801 
(calling for reinstatement of Secure Communities Program). 
 154 Golshan, supra note 46 (“We will issue detainers for illegal immigrants who are arrested 
for any crime whatsoever, and they will be placed into immediate removal proceedings if we even 
have to do that.”). 
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5. Other Joint Operations 
In addition to the programs already described, the Trump administra-
tion plans to rely on a range of additional cooperative arrangements with 
local law enforcement to accomplish mass deportation. As Trump told the 
crowd in his Phoenix immigration speech: “2 million people. Criminal al-
iens. We will begin moving them out day one. As soon as I take office. Day 
one. In joint operations with local, state and federal law enforcement.”155 
Similarly, former DHS Secretary Kelly ordered that “task forces” that the 
federal government uses to enforce immigration law and enhance border 
security should “include participants from other federal, state, and local 
agencies . . . .”156 
One type of joint operation is the 287(g) agreements already discussed, 
but there are many other similar programs that rely on local law enforce-
ment to accomplish federal enforcement goals.157 For example, Operation 
Community Shield is a joint operation that works together with local law 
enforcement to target street gangs for criminal prosecution and deporta-
tion.158 This joint operation initiative has been expanded under the Trump 
administration and renamed the “National Gang Unit.”159 Similarly, since 
2003 ICE has run a National Fugitive Operations Team that works with lo-
                                                                                                                           
 155 Id. (“We will end the sanctuary cities that have resulted in so many needless deaths.”). The 
promise to “end” sanctuary cities was to be fulfilled by “cancel[ing] all federal funding to sanctu-
ary cities” in Trump’s first 100 days in office. See Trump’s Contract, supra note 2. 
 156 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAl-
aneen et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 12 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-
Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3H7-VCC7] (“In addi-
tion, the task forces should include participants from other federal, state, and local agencies, and 
should target individuals and organizations whose criminal conduct undermines border security or 
the integrity of the immigration system, including offenses related to alien smuggling or traffick-
ing, drug trafficking, illegal entry and reentry, visa fraud, identity theft, unlawful possession or use 
of official documents, and acts of violence committed against persons or property at or near the 
border.”). 
 157 See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRS., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE NA-
TION’S BORDERS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EFFORTS 6 (July 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/
~/media/assets/2014/07/immigrationenforcementbriefjuly2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/69RS-76BX] 
(describing different kinds of joint operations); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? 
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1563, 1579–98 (2010) (describing joint operations). 
 158 National Gang Unit: Operation Community Shield, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT (2017), https://www.ice.gov/national-gang-unit [https://perma.cc/XCG5-QF78]; see also 
Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street 
Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–33 (tracing the origin and expansion of Opera-
tion Community Shield and ICE’s reliance on lists of individuals identified as gang members 
based on criteria controlled by state and local police). 
 159 National Gang Unit, supra note 158. 
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cal, state, and federal law enforcement to locate noncitizens with final or-
ders of deportation.160 
By facilitating local-federal cooperation, joint operations risk entangling 
jurisdictions in immigration enforcement. The Santa Cruz Police Department 
learned this in February 2017 when it participated in a joint raid following a 
five-year investigation with ICE’s gang initiative.161 Although ICE told Santa 
Cruz that the operation would target dangerous gang members, individuals 
with no gang affiliation were arrested in the raid and deported by ICE.162 
These kinds of “collateral” arrests involuntarily involve local law enforce-
ment in the routine enforcement of immigration law. In Los Angeles, advoca-
cy groups have similarly raised concerns about participation of the Los Ange-
les Police Department (“LAPD”) participation in joint raids with the Home-
land Security Investigations (“HSI”)163 and Enforcement and Removal Op-
erations division of ICE.164 Although purportedly targeting gang and drug 
activity, such joint operations have resulted in the “collateral arrest” of noncit-
                                                                                                                           
 160 Fact Sheet: ICE Fugitive Operations Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf/fugops.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG4H-JESH]; 
National Gang Unit, supra note 158. See generally MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST., COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PRO-
GRAM 1, 5–7 (Feb. 2009), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ice-fugitive-operations-
program [https://perma.cc/B5F7-D6L2]. 
 161 Although the Santa Cruz Police Department participated in the joint raid, the Santa Cruz 
County Sheriff steered clear when he was unable to obtain satisfactory guarantees that his deputies 
would not end up participating in immigration arrests. Hamed Aleaziz, ‘Collateral’ Immigration 
Arrests Threaten Key Crime Alliances, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.sfchronicle.com/
bayarea/article/Collateral-immigration-arrests-threaten-key-11106426.php [https://perma.cc/9HZL-
Z3XT]. 
 162 Richard Winton & James Queally, Santa Cruz and Federal Agents in War of Words over 
Whether a Gang Sweep Was Really a Secret Immigration Raid, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 9:20 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-cruz-ice-raid-20170223-story.html [https://
perma.cc/H4C5-JZAK]. 
 163 HSI is the “largest investigative unit” within the DHS. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, BUDGET OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2018 CONGRESSION-
AL JUSTIFICATION 63 (Oct. 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CFO/17_
0524_U.S._Immigration_and_Customs_Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK2A-FFDM]. Although 
it purports to be principally focused on “significant threats to the safety and security of the Ameri-
can public,” under the Trump administration its mission has expanded to include routine immigra-
tion arrests. Id.; Aleaziz, supra note 161 (reporting that HSI “is now mandated to make collateral 
immigration arrests of nontargeted individuals” encountered during HSI operations). Given that 
there are more HSI agents than ICE deportation officers, this expanded mission would “‘effective-
ly double[] immigration enforcement officers in the U.S.’” Id. (quoting Professor Pratheepan Gu-
lasekaram). 
 164 See Letter from ICE Out of LA Coal. et al. to Charlie Beck, Chief of Police, L.A. Police 
Dep’t (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3223904-2016-04-26-Letter-
to-Chief-Beck.html [https://perma.cc/9BHF-ZNSG]. 
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izen residents for immigration purposes. Such a result conflicts directly with 
local sanctuary policies in place in Los Angeles.165 
II. “SANCTUARY” POLICIES IN AN ERA OF MASS DEPORTATION 
Part I described the rise of crimmigration and introduced the major 
components of Trump’s deportation apparatus—CAP, administrative war-
rants, 287(g), Secure Communities, and other joint operations.166 Collec-
tively, these programs generate significant pressure on localities to make 
their law enforcement resources available for federal immigration enforce-
ment. In Part II, we turn to an analysis of the policies of “sanctuary” juris-
dictions in the United States. Specifically, we focus on how these policies 
function to protect community members and limit the involvement of local 
government institutions in furthering the Trump administration’s immigra-
tion agenda.167 
In conducting our analysis, we collected a set of over 500 sanctuary 
policies spanning nearly four decades. To aid other researchers, we have 
made full text versions of the all of the laws and policies we collected avail-
able in an accompanying online library.168 Our library of sanctuary policies 
focuses on those policies that explicitly address the degree to which local 
criminal justice systems and actors interact with federal immigration en-
forcement.169  
                                                                                                                           
 165 Id.; see also David Noriega, Under Trump, Sanctuary Cities May Not Be So Safe, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2016, 10:21 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/davidnoriega/the-lapd-says-it-wont-
work-with-feds-on-deportations-but-it?utm_term=.pqGW90PNJ#.xrQoEp9gA [https://perma.cc/
UPF3-BHH6] (documenting instances of LAPD collaboration with HSI). 
 166 See supra notes 68–165 and accompanying text. 
 167 See infra notes 181–248 and accompanying text. 
 168 See WESTMINSTER LAW LIBR., supra note 10. 
 169 Some policies that nevertheless affect immigrants with criminal justice involvement ex-
ceed our definition of sanctuary policies because they don’t explicity address the degree of inter-
action between local law enforcement and federal immigration enforcement, and therefore are not 
included in our collection of sanctuary policies. For example, we did not include policies that 
reduce sentences for low-level misdemeanors to less than 365 days in an attempt to alleviate im-
migration consequences of convictions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18.5 (West Supp. 2018) 
(“Every offense which is prescribed by any law of the state to be punishable by imprisonment in a 
country jail up to or not exceeding one year shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a 
period not to exceed 364 days.”); Jon Murray & Noelle Phillips, Denver Is Set to Change Its Sentenc-
ing Ordinance to Help Some Immigrants Avoid Deportation, DENV. POST (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:35 PM), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2017/04/27/denver-sentencing-reform-immigrants-deportation/ [https://
perma.cc/E6KN-7DVQ]. Policies encouraging or affecting cite-and-release practices (in lieu of ar-
rest) similarly can change the shape of the criminal justice-to-deportation pipeline, but often do 
not explicly relate to immigration, and are therefore not included. See Eagly, supra note 138, at 
1157–69 (describing various “alienage-neutral” policies in place in Los Angeles, California affect-
ing immigrants).  
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 We relied on a range of techniques to identify and collect our set of 
sanctuary policies for analysis. We identified many policies by scouring 
academic sources,170 issue papers,171 news articles,172 and online collections 
of policies accumulated by advocacy groups across the political spec-
trum.173 We also obtained copies of the policies through public records re-
quests, communications with practitioners, and internet and other online 
research.174 Because our authors have been engaged in scholarship, re-
search, and advocacy relating to sanctuary policies, many policies (particu-
larly those enacted in the last decade) were already known to us. Although 
we cannot claim to have surveyed every sanctuary policy, we believe our 
collection of policies provides the largest single collection available of the 
various policies that have been enacted since the 1980s. 
Based on our review of the collected policies, we identified five prin-
ciple types of legal and policy initiatives adopted by jurisdictions. These 
five types, which we discuss in Part II, are: (1) barring investigations into 
immigration violations; (2) limiting compliance with ICE detainers and ad-
ministrative warrants; (3) limiting ICE’s access to local jails; (4) limiting 
disclosure of sensitive information; and (5) declining to participate in joint 
operations.175 We introduce each category of policy, drawing on examples 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See, e.g., Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbol-
ism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 297, 297–98 & nn. 1–4 (1989) (identifying 
sanctuary provisions); Daniel D. McMillan, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doc-
trine: Much Ado About Nothing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516–17 & nn.19–21 (1987) (listing 
thirteen cities and one state, New Mexico, as self-identified “sanctuary” jurisdictions); Pham, 
Constitutional Right, supra note 6, at 1382–84 (examining sanctuary laws enacted in the 1980s); 
id. at 1386–91 (examining sanctuary laws passed after 9/11). 
 171 See, e.g., MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE 
AND LOCAL “SANCTUARY” POLICIES LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
(July 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43457.pdf [https://perma.cc/M73M-QGRP]; LISA M. 
SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE 
AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 & nn.85–87 (Aug. 2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
library/P1072.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWD2-L8WZ].  
 172 See, e.g., James Coates, In New Sanctuary Debate, Fine Line Divides Criminal, Refugee, 
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 29, 1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-12-29/news/8503300162_1_
skid-row-ordinance-seattle-city-council [https://perma.cc/W7KP-VJE9] (identifying eleven cities 
with “sanctuary ordinances”). 
 173 See, e.g., FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, SANCTUARY POLICIES ACROSS THE U.S. 
(Oct. 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/180487047/Sanctuary-Policies-Across-the-U-S [https://
perma.cc/MJ5A-57C8]; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES IN-
STITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LO-
CAL AUTHORITIES (Dec. 2008), http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-LocalLawsResolutions
AndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W6T-DMBT]. 
 174 We were able to search archived versions of local policies by using the Internet Archive 
Wayback Machine. See WAYBACK MACHINE, http://web.archive.org.  
 175 In choosing the five most common policy types to analyze, we acknowledge that there are 
other important types of policies that also serve to disentangle the immigration system from local 
law enforcement. For example, policies to limit courthouse immigration arrests seem to be taking 
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of state laws, municipal ordinances and resolutions, and internal sheriff and 
police regulations and policies.176 
The Trump presidency has driven localities to clarify their role in im-
migration enforcement. Local officials must consider how best to respond to 
the divisive racial tenor of the Trump administration’s immigration policy 
pronouncements within their communities. But whereas some jurisdictions 
have newly embraced the sanctuary policies we discuss in this Part since the 
election, others have had such policies in place for decades.177 In addition, 
some policies, such as detainer policies, developed in response to develop-
ments in federal law or policy that pre-date the Trump presidency.  
Regardless of when these policies were enacted, they share some 
common characteristics. For example, the Trump administration has sought 
to bring sanctuary jurisdictions to heel by claiming that their policies violate 
8 U.S.C. § 1373,178 a provision of the federal code that prohibits localities 
from preventing their employees from exchanging citizenship or immigra-
tion status information of individuals with federal officials.179 But, as our 
description of the policies in this Part makes clear, many disentanglement 
policies do not restrict the sharing of information about citizenship or im-
                                                                                                                           
on greater importance. See generally Christopher N. Lasch, A Common-Law Privilege to Protect 
State and Local Courts During the Crimmigration Crisis, 127 YALE L.J. F. 410, 410–14 (2017). For 
examples of courthouse policies, see New Mexico, Second Judicial Dist. Court, Policy No. 2017-
SJDC-010 (Nov. 20, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=41672578 [https://perma.
cc/3AK2-PG96] (prohibiting courthouse arrests except in narrow circumstances); cf. N.Y. Gov’r 
Exec. Order No. 170.1 (Apr. 25, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=41665592 
[https://perma.cc/T2FM-72RW] (prohibiting immigration arrests, except “when accompanied by a 
judicial warrant,” in New York “state facilities”). 
 176 For an alternative approach to organizing policies addressing or limiting cooperation with 
federal immigration authorities, see generally Huyen Pham, A Framework for Understanding 
Subfederal Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 13 UNIV. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 508, 511–24 (2017) 
(introducing six models for local law enforcement participation in immigration enforcement based 
on the level of cooperation with federal immigration authorities). 
 177 According to a study conducted by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, as of 2016 over 
600 counties across the country had in place some rules or regulations limiting local law enforce-
ment participation in federal immigration enforcement. GRABER & MARQUEZ, supra note 25, at 
11; see also National Map, supra note 26 (publishing a map that “shows the degree to which local 
law enforcement offer assistance to federal immigration authorities, as well as the degree to which 
localities have enacted laws or policies limiting their involvement in federal immigration en-
forcement”). 
 178 Lai & Lasch, supra note 9, at 557–62 (describing the Trump administration’s use of 
§ 1373 against sanctuary jurisdictions). 
 179 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012) (providing that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or 
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, 
or receiving from [federal immigration authorities] information regarding the citizenship or immi-
gration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”). Section 1373 is arguably unenforceable. 
See infra notes 222–226 and accompanying text. 
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migration status and therefore cannot run afoul of § 1373.180 Under federal 
law, localities have discretion to decide whether they will engage in local 
policing activity that may result in deportation. 
A. Barring Investigation of Civil and Criminal Immigration Violations 
Perhaps the most common type of sanctuary policy is a requirement 
that police not investigate civil or criminal immigration violations.181 These 
types of internal policies, which have been called “don’t police” policies,182 
are important given that local law enforcement officers can act as deporta-
tion “gatekeepers” when they arrest noncitizens.183 Such policies generally 
prevent law enforcement from asking questions about immigration status or 
otherwise enforcing civil immigration law violations.184 Some “don’t po-
lice” policies go further and prevent police from investigating criminal im-
migration law violations.185 
An early example of a “don’t police” policy is the LAPD’s “Special 
Order Number 40,” issued by Chief Daryl Gates in 1979.186 Special Order 
40 prohibits officers from “initiat[ing] police action with the objective of 
discovering the alien status of a person.”187 In addition, it prevents officers 
from arresting or booking persons for illegal entry into the United States 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325.188 Similarly, in 1989, San Francisco adopted a “City 
and County of Refuge” ordinance that provides that state and local officials 
“have no duty . . . to enforce the civil aspects of the federal immigration 
laws.”189 More recently, in 2008, the City of Hartford, Connecticut enacted 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. 
L. REV. 245, 254–64 (2016) (discussing such policies). 
 181 Id.; see also Eisha Jain, Understanding Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 
95 TEX. L. REV. 161 (2017) (noting that protective policing practices can help to ameliorate the 
collateral consequences that flow from arrest). 
 182 Eagly, supra note 180, at 258. 
 183 Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State 
and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1856 (2011) (noting that 
the “core problem” with local enforcement of immigration is that it makes local police and sheriffs 
“act as gatekeepers” in the immigration system). 
 184 Eagly, supra note 180, at 261–64. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Office of the Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t, Special Order No. 40, Undocumented 
Aliens (Nov. 27, 1979) [hereinafter LAPD Special Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34432079 [https://perma.cc/22MQ-KNBT]. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 375-89 (Oct. 24, 1989) [hereinafter S.F. Ordinance], http://
libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432127 [https://perma.cc/8CPS-HLVE] (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). New York City made similar observations about federal responsibility for 
immigration enforcement in enacting Executive Order 124. See N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 
124 (Aug. 7, 1989) [hereinafter NYC Exec. Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=
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an ordinance restricting any employee from “inquir[ing] about . . . confiden-
tial information,” including immigration status, except when “necessary to 
the provision of the city service in question.”190 
Some states have also restricted their police agencies from enforcing 
civil immigration law. In 1987, Oregon passed a state law prohibiting law 
enforcement throughout the state, including political subdivisions of the state, 
from enforcing civil immigration law.191 In 2014 the State of Vermont passed 
a law requiring that all local law enforcement agencies adopt a “model fair 
and impartial policing policy” that prohibits policing civil immigration viola-
tions.192 Among other restrictions, the model policy adopted in 2017 specifies 
that local law enforcement in Vermont may not: (1) ask for a “person’s civil 
immigration status unless it is necessary to the ongoing investigation of a 
criminal offense”; (2) use suspicion of a person’s undocumented status as a 
basis for initiating contact, detaining, or arresting that person; or (3) attempt 
“to enforce federal criminal law” where the only violation is “unauthorized 
presence in the country[,] . . . a civil infraction.”193 And, in 2017, the Califor-
nia Values Act was enacted, similarly prohibiting local law enforcement from 
expending resources “to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest per-
sons for immigration enforcement purposes . . . .”194 
                                                                                                                           
34436598 [https://perma.cc/5NHT-TTYU] (“Federal law places full responsibility for immigra-
tion control on the federal government. With limited exceptions, the City therefore has no legal 
obligation to report any alien to federal authorities. The executive order, in recognition of this lack 
of obligation and the importance of providing the services covered herein, requires City agencies 
to preserve the confidentiality of all information respecting law-abiding aliens to the extent per-
mitted by law.”). 
 190 Hartford, Conn., Mun. Code ch. 2, art. XXI, §§ 2-925 to -929 (2008) [hereinafter Hartford 
Ordinance], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434291 [https://perma.cc/NDX9-Z9X8]. 
 191 OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.820 (West Supp. 2017) (formerly ORE. REV. STAT. § 181.850, 
enacted Laws 1987, c. 467, § 1). 
 192 2014 Vermont Laws No. 193, § 3 (S. 184) (June 17, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=35254870 [https://perma.cc/BFW4-VS6K] (amending VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, 
§ 2366). The 2014 legislation required the State Criminal Justice Training Council to develop a 
model fair and impartial policing policy, and further required each law enforcement agency in 
Vermont to to adopt a policy “that includes, at a minimum, the elements” of the model policy. Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 193 VT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING COUNCIL, MODEL FAIR AND IMPARTIAL POLICING 
POLICY ¶¶ VIII, IX (2017) [hereinafter 2017 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY], http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=41582278 [https://perma.cc/65SB-SCMY]. The model poli-
cy also specifies that law enforcement may not “arrest or detain any individual based on an immi-
gration ‘administrative warrant’ or ‘immigration detainer.’” Id. ¶ VIII(d). 
 194 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West Supp. 2018) (enacted as part of California S.B. 54 (Oct. 
5, 2017)). 
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B. Limiting Compliance with Immigration Detainers and  
Administrative Warrants 
Federal pressure to participate in immigration enforcement has 
prompted a second type of local disentanglement policy: limiting compli-
ance with immigration detainers and administrative immigration warrants. 
Given the Secure Communities program’s reliance on immigration detain-
ers, declining these federal requests has become a prominent way by which 
localities are expressing resistance to the program. 
Practices limiting detainer compliance are found in a range of local or-
dinances, state laws, and internal policing directives. Early examples of 
such policies typically stopped short of denying all requests to extend de-
tention for deportation purposes. For example, the California and Connecti-
cut TRUST Acts mandated that localities decline detainers unless issued 
against persons with certain criminal charges or convictions.195 Similarly, 
local policies in Cook County, Illinois and New York City included numer-
ous criminal history-based exceptions to the general rule of not complying 
with immigration detainers.196 
More recent policies now provide that juridictions not honor any de-
tainer unless it is accompanied by a judicial warrant or other documentation 
establishing probable cause of a crime. For example, the Alameda County 
Sheriff’s Office has announced that it will decline all immigration detainers 
from ICE, distinguishing between “an arrest warrant signed by a judge, and 
an immigration detainer signed by an ICE Agent.”197 The weight of judicial 
                                                                                                                           
 195 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282 (West 2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192h (2017). 
 196 See Cook Cty., Ill. Ordinance No. 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Cook Ordinance], 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434520 [https://perma.cc/Z87Y-MJBS] (allow-
ing detainer compliance where target of detainer “is convicted of a serious or violent felony of-
fense for which he or she is currently in custody” or “has been convicted of a serious or violent 
felony within 10 years of the request, or was released after having served a sentence for a serious 
or violent felony within 5 years of the request, whichever is later”); N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 
62 (Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter NYC Local Law 62], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34436609 [https://perma.cc/5YE9-VNM4] (including numerous crime-based exceptions to 
non-compliance with detainers). 
 197 Memorandum from Colby Staysa, Captain, Alameda Cty. Sheriff’s Office, to Det. & Corr. 
Pers. (May 21, 2014) [hereinafter Alameda Memorandum], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34432481 [https://perma.cc/7DEK-CN8V]; see also Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 
(allowing no compliance with detainers whatsoever, absent written agreement for reimbursement 
of costs); Walla Walla Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Special Order No. 2014-002 (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437104 [https://perma.cc/3GVN-RUMM] (order-
ing the Walla Walla County Sheriff’s Office to cease holding individuals in custody “when the 
only authority for such custody is a request contained in a DHS ICE immigration detainer” unless 
there is “independent information” from a law enforcement agency establishing “sufficient legal 
basis for detention, such as probable cause or a confirmed warrant”); CTY. SHERIFFS OF COLO., 
WHAT AUTHORITY DO SHERIFFS HAVE RELATING TO IMMIGRATION LAW? 1 (Dec. 2016), http://
libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434218 [https://perma.cc/SP5Z-SELL] (“Outside of 
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decisions now firmly establishes that the federal government cannot require 
jurisdictions to comply with detainers.198 Courts have also made clear that 
holding someone on a detainer amounts to a new arrest that must comply 
with the Constitution.199  
In addition, many jurisdictions have implemented policies prohibiting 
detention based not only on immigration detainers but also on administra-
tive immigration warrants for arrest. The Princeton Police Department, for 
example, has a General Order prohibiting police from “arrest[ing] or other-
wise detain[ing] persons” based on an ICE administrative warrant contained 
in the NCIC database.200 An administrative arrest warrant is a document 
issued by an ICE official stating that the officer has determined there is 
probable cause to believe that an individual is subject to removal.201 Unlike 
criminal arrest warrants, administrative arrest warrants are neither issued by 
a judge nor based on sworn testimony, and the statute and regulation that 
                                                                                                                           
legally recognized exigent circumstances, we cannot hold persons in jail at the request of a local 
police officer or a federal agent. To do so, would violate the 4th Amendment to the US Constitu-
tion.”); Karl S. Leonard, A Special Message from Sheriff Karl Leonard, CHESTERFIELD CTY. SHER-
IFF’S OFFICE (Oct. 12, 2015), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436987 [https://
perma.cc/7SK7-2A7X] (explaining that “an ICE detainer request is not issued by the court” and 
therefore “is not a legal document allowing the Sheriff’s Office to legally detain an inmate for 
additional time unrelated to the original criminal charge”); Alameda Memorandum, supra (declar-
ing that the Sheriff’s Office would henceforth decline immigration detainers from ICE, and distin-
guishing between “an arrest warrant signed by a judge, and an immigration detainer signed by an 
ICE Agent”). 
 198 See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 199 See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 149, at 2 n.1 (citing cases for this propostion). 
 200 Princeton, N.J. Police Dep’t, General Order, Enforcement of Immigration Laws 3 (Nov. 
11, 2013) [hereinafter Princeton PD General Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34435940 [https://perma.cc/2H8H-ZRHT] (“Officers shall not arrest or otherwise detain per-
sons who are entered in the NCIC/SCIC system by [ICE] unless the entry is for an actual criminal 
arrest warrant . . . . An NCIC/SCIC immigration status warning hit is not an arrest warrant and as 
such, officers have no authority to detain or arrest on the basis of an immigration status warn-
ing.”); see also Hartford Ordinance, supra note 190, § 2-928 (“Hartford police officers shall not 
make arrests or detain individuals based on administrative warrants for removal entered by ICE 
into the National Crime Information Center database.”); GRAND ISLE CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, FAIR 
AND IMPARTIAL POLICING POLICY ¶ 5 (2016), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=344
37064 [https://perma.cc/LRZ9-CEGH] (“Administrative warrants, immigration detainers, and 
requests for notification issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have not been 
reviewed by a neutral magistrate and do not have the authority of a judicial warrant. Therefore, 
Grand Isle County Sheriff’s Department members shall not comply with such requests.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL, ch. 41.6.1, 
¶¶ 15–16 (Sept. 25, 2016) [hereinafter NOPD POLICY], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34434807 [https://perma.cc/6LJ4-AL6A] (providing that “members shall take no ac-
tion against an individual in response to an ICE administrative warrant” but allowing for execution 
of criminal warrants). 
 201 FORM I-200 WARRANT, supra note 125.  
2018] Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” 1743 
mention these warrants identify no standard of proof for their issuance.202 
Until March 2017, DHS did not even require ICE officials to obtain an ad-
ministrative warrant before issuing a detainer.203 The lack of judicial and 
constitutional safeguards for administrative arrest warrants arguably render 
the federal government’s reliance on them constitutionally suspect.204 But 
even if they properly authorize ICE to conduct an arrest, they do not neces-
sarily authorize local authorities to do so.205 
C. Refusing ICE Access to Jails 
Another way in which local jurisdictions have protected immigrants is 
by declining to let ICE agents enter their local jails. Indeed, the CAP pro-
gram introduced in Part I relied on local jail access to interview and deport 
inmates held in local custody.206 Information obtained from in-person inter-
views of inmates is also significant for the Secure Communities program, as 
it supplements data available through the fingerprint-sharing function. 
Limiting ICE access to jails was a critical part of New York City’s ef-
fort to disentangle local law enforcement from ICE. On February 14, 2015, 
immigration authorities were shut out of the New York City jail at Riker’s 
Island pursuant to New York City Local Law 58, which prohibited federal 
officials from “maintain[ing] an office or quarters on land over which the 
[Department of Corrections] exercises jurisdiction, for the purpose of inves-
tigating possible violations of civil immigration law . . . .”207 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(3) (2017). 
 203 ICE POLICY 10074.2, supra note 129, ¶ 2.4. 
 204 See El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 276 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(finding an ICE detainer was a “warrantless” arrest because its validity had not been inspected by 
a “neutral magistrate [or] . . . executive official”); see also United States v. Toledo, 615 F. Supp. 
2d 453, 455, 457 n.2 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (treating ICE warrant as invalid because it could not be 
executed by local law enforcement officials); Ochoa v. Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1252–53 
(E.D. Wash. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell, 716 Fed. 
App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting infirmities in administrative warrant in that it was not issued by 
a neutral official and provided no factual details to support probable cause determination). 
 205 The Supreme Court has noted that administrative immigration arrest warrants are “execut-
ed by federal officers who have received training in the enforcement of immigration law.” Arizona 
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.2(b), 287.5(e)(3) (2012)).  
 206 See, e.g., Letter from Jim McDonnell, Sheriff, Cty. of L.A., to Bd. of Supervisors, Cty. of 
L.A. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://libguides.law.ucla.edu/ld.php?content_id=16697631 [https://perma.cc/
PLA2-35CM] (describing a policy under which ICE would be permitted to interview certain jail 
inmates and “allowed access to all inmates” during the release process); Vanessa Rancano, Fresno 
Sheriff’s ICE Partnership May Give a Glimpse of Trump-Era Deportations, KQED NEWS (Mar. 3, 
2017), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/03/03/fresno-sheriffs-ice-partnership-may-give-a-glimpse-
of-trump-era-deportations/ [https://perma.cc/H43B-ETTV] (describing partnership between Fres-
no Sheriff and ICE that allows for interviews of immigrants in the jail). 
 207 N.Y.C., N.Y., Local Law No. 58, § 4 (Nov. 14, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=35216927 [https://perma.cc/878M-V6JJ]; see also Mayor Bill de Blasio Signs into 
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Similar measures are now in place in other jurisdictions. For example, 
in Cook County, Illinois and Richmond, California ICE agents are not al-
lowed to enter the local jails without a criminal warrant or other legitimate 
law enforcement purpose other than civil immigration enforcement.208 In 
the District of Columbia, local law enforcement may not provide ICE “an 
office, booth, or any facility or equipment for a generalized search of or 
inquiry about inmates . . . .”209 Santa Clara, California will not allow ICE 
agents to enter their county jails for “investigative interviews or other pur-
poses . . . .”210 
And, although not an absolute bar to jail access, some policies have at-
tempted to create a procedural firewall between noncitizens and federal im-
migration authorities by requiring a Miranda-type warning in the event ICE 
seeks to interview inmates. As one example, the California TRUTH Act re-
quires inmates be provided with a “written consent form” and be given the 
opportunity to decline an ICE interview or have a representative present be-
fore proceeding.211 These sorts of protections help fill a gap created by 
                                                                                                                           
Law Bills to Dramatically Reduce New York City’s Cooperation with U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement Deportations, NYC.GOV (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/520-14/mayor-bill-de-blasio-signs-law-bills-dramatically-reduce-new-york-city-s-
cooperation-with#/0 [https://perma.cc/5WXE-FW7R]. 
 208 Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (“Unless ICE agents have a criminal warrant, or County 
officials have a legitimate law enforcement purpose that is not related to the enforcement of im-
migration laws, ICE agents shall not be given access to individuals or allowed to use County facil-
ities for investigative interviews or other purposes . . . .”); RICHMOND POLICE DEP’T, POLICY 
MANUAL ¶ 428.2.4 (Aug. 2013), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34433110 [https://
perma.cc/TK4A-UBJ8] (prohibiting ICE from accessing holding facilities without “federal warrant 
or order signed by a judge” and prohibiting access to police booking records without supervisor’s 
authorization); see also ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS EN-
FORCEMENT (ICE) PROCEDURES (June 21, 2013) [hereinafter ORLEANS PARISH POLICY], http://
libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434891 [https://perma.cc/BN2N-8KHK] (“Absent a 
criminal warrant or court order transferring custody, no ICE agent shall be permitted into the se-
cure area of the Intake and Processing Center.”). 
 209 D.C. Act 19-379 (June 15, 2012), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434376 
[https://perma.cc/DEF4-KHH8]. 
 210 Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Policy Res. No. 2011-504, Exhibit A, § 3.54 (Oct. 18, 2011) [here-
inafter 2011 Santa Clara Policy], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432167 [https://
perma.cc/E2GV-QV8W] (mandating that ICE agents “shall not be given access to individuals or 
be allowed to use County facilities for investigative interviews or other purposes”). 
 211 A.B. 2792, ch. 768, 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34433572 [https://perma.cc/N832-HKMJ]; see also D.C. Act 19-379, supra note 209, 
sec. 2, § 7(d)(1) (prohibiting the District from “permit[ting] an ICE agent to conduct an individu-
alized interview of an inmate without giving the inmate an opportunity to have counsel present”); 
D.C., Mayor’s Order No. 2011-174 (Oct. 19, 2011), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34434367 [https://perma.cc/WA3P-XLBB] (requiring, prior to interview of inmate by ICE, “a 
disclosure to the inmate that all information provided to federal agents, including ICE agents, may 
be used in a criminal, immigration, deportation, or other collateral cases”); ORLEANS PARISH 
POLICY, supra note 208 (requiring as precondition to ICE interviews of inmates held by the sheriff 
that ICE “notify the subject inmate’s attorney, provide a reasonable opportunity for counsel to be 
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federal court decisions extending the booking exception for Miranda to 
questioning by ICE agents—even if the information elicited is inculpatory—
so long as there is an administrative purpose to the questioning.212 
D. Limiting Disclosure of Sensitive Information 
Many sanctuary jurisdictions have sought to impose limits on the unnec-
essary sharing of sensitive information about their residents. Sensitive infor-
mation may include citizenship and immigration status as well as other in-
formation that residents would be fearful of being disclosed to third parties.213  
Two types of limitations on the sharing of sensitive information appear 
in the local policies we studied. First, some jurisdictions limit the sharing of 
confidential information about residents by city or county officials, includ-
ing law enforcement, to encourage residents to feel safer when accessing 
local services or interacting with local government authorities. These limita-
tions can encompass information about citizenship or immigration status, 
but often are not limited to such.214 Hartford’s restriction on disclosure of 
“confidential information,” for example, encompasses an individual’s sexu-
al orientation, status as a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, sta-
tus as a crime witness, receipt of public assistance, as well as immigration 
status and “all information contained in any individual’s income tax rec-
ords.”215 Los Angeles takes a functional approach, protecting personally 
identifying information, described as information the City possess which 
could allow someone to determine citizenship or immigration status.216 
Second, local jurisdictions have established policies declining to pro-
vide information in response to requests by ICE about the release dates of 
                                                                                                                           
present during the interview, and certify to OPSO that this notice and opportunity has occurred”); 
PHILA. DEP’T OF PRISONS, INMATE CONSENT FORM—ICE INTERVIEW (on file with authors). 
 212 See Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REV. 277, 322–23 (2013) 
(discussing the overreliance on the subjective purpose of questioning in applying the booking 
exception to Miranda). 
 213 See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., SAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR POLICIES LIMITING THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 3, 6 (Nov. 2004), http://www.
ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-SampleLanguageForPolicies.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN6W-DNQK] 
(defining “confidential information” to include immigration status as well as sexual orientation, 
status as a victim of domestic violence or sexual assault, receipt of public benefits, and all infor-
mation disclosed in income tax records). 
 214 See, e.g., Hartford Ordinance, supra note 190, § 2-926 (defining “confidential infor-
mation” to include immigration status); id. § 2-929 (limiting disclosure of “confidential infor-
mation”); Seattle, Wash., Res. No. 31730, § 1(M) (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Seattle Resolution], 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437121 [https://perma.cc/L24Q-TXTY]; Los 
Angeles, Cal., Exec. Directive No. 20 (Mar. 21, 2017) [hereinafter L.A. Directive], http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35642839 [https://perma.cc/LE8K-MXGN]. 
 215 Hartford Ordinance, supra note 190, § 2-926. 
 216 L.A. Directive, supra note 214, at 4. 
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inmates held in local jails.217 By not notifying immigration authorities about 
the time and place of an individual’s release from custody, these jurisdic-
tions are refusing to facilitate the individual’s arrest by ICE. For example, a 
2011 Cook County, Illinois ordinance directed that, without a “criminal 
warrant” or “legitimate law enforcement purpose . . . not related to the en-
forcement of immigration laws,” County officials “shall not expend their 
time responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding in-
dividuals’ incarceration status or release dates while on duty.”218 New York 
City similarly requires a judicial warrant as a requisite to notification of 
release dates.219 
The Trump administration has claimed that policies limiting the ex-
change of information between local officials and federal immigration offi-
cials violate federal law, pointing to 8 U.S.C. § 1373.220 But many of the 
policies that the administration has criticized on this basis do not limit the 
sharing of citizenship and immigration status information and thus fall out-
side the reach of § 1373. This is particularly true of policies that limit noti-
fication of release dates of individuals in local custody.221 
                                                                                                                           
 217 These policies are sometimes a part of broader policies limiting compliance with ICE 
detainers, which also cover ICE’s requests for prolonged detention of inmates otherwise entitled to 
release. See supra notes 195–205 and accompanying text (discussing resistance to complying with 
immigration detainers).  
 218 Cook Ordinance, supra note 196; see also NYC Local Law 62, supra note 196, § 9-
131(b)(1) (prohibiting notification in certain circumstances); ORLEANS PARISH POLICY, supra 
note 208 (prohibiting sheriffs from notifying ICE of release dates); 2011 Santa Clara Policy, supra 
note 210 (“County personnel shall not expend County time or resources responding to ICE inquir-
ies or communicating with ICE regarding individuals’ incarceration status or release dates.”). 
 219 See NYC Local Law 62, supra note 196, § 9-131(b)(1).  
 220 See supra note 186 and accompanying text; Sessions Remarks, supra note 52 (pointing to 
§ 1373 in support of the claim that sanctuary jurisdictions “violate federal law”). 
 221 Steinle v. City & Cty. of S.F., 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The court in 
Steinle explained that the restrictions of § 1373 are plain, and that “no plausible reading of 
[§ 1373’s] ‘information regarding . . . citizenship or immigration status’ encompasses the release 
date of an undocumented inmate.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)). Many other types of disentan-
glement likewise do not implicate § 1373’s narrow mandate because they do not address “infor-
mation regarding . . . citizenship or immigration status.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For examples, policies that prohibit police from investigating the civil immigration status of local 
residents, see supra notes 181–194 and accompanying text, do not violate § 1373 because they 
regulate the circumstances in which officers may inquire into citizenship and immigration status, 
not whether they can maintain or voluntarily share that information with federal authorities. Like-
wise, policies that determine whether local law enforcement should detain inmates beyond their 
release date at the request of federal immigration officials, see supra notes 195–205 and accompa-
nying text, do not implicate § 1373 because such policies are directed at whether local law en-
forcement may take action, i.e., hold someone based on suspected immigration status, rather than 
at communication with ICE. See Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 731 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(holding that LAPD Special Order Number 40 “addresses only the initiation of police action and 
arrests for illegal entry,” and § 1373 “does not address the initiation of police action or arrests for 
illegal entry; it addresses only communications with ICE”). 
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Furthermore, § 1373 arguably amounts to an unconstitutional intrusion 
on state sovereignty.222 At a minimum, it must be construed narrowly to 
avoid unduly infringing on state sovereignty.223 In City of New York v. Unit-
ed States, the only federal court decision to directly address § 1373’s consti-
tutionality, the Second Circuit rejected New York City’s facial challenge to 
§ 1373 but acknowledged that applying § 1373 to bar “generalized confi-
dentiality policies that are necessary to the performance of legitimate mu-
nicipal functions” could run afoul of the Tenth Amendment.224 Following 
the decision, the City Mayor issued precisely the kind of “generalized con-
fidentiality policy” the court suggested would be permissible,225 and as dis-
cussed earlier, other jurisdictions have followed suit.226 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 103, 159–64 (2012) (arguing that § 1373 imposes information-sharing requirements that 
violate Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle); see also Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Ex-
ecutive Order on Sanctuary Cities Is Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/constitutional-problems-with-trumps-
executive-order-on-sanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.3db1ce3a9223 [https://perma.cc/65MX-UXB8] 
(arguing that § 1373 violates the Tenth Amendment because it is an attempt by the federal gov-
ernment “to prevent states from controlling their employees’ use of information that ‘is available 
to them only in their official capacity’”). The City and County of San Francisco, in its lawsuit 
challenging President Trump’s executive order threatening to defund sanctuary jurisdiction, has 
argued that § 1373 is facially unconstitutional. S.F. Complaint, supra note 57, at 20 (arguing 
§ 1373 cannot be constitutionally applied to prohibit confidentiality requirements in San Francis-
co’s Sanctuary City law “enacted to further legitimate local interests grounded in the basic police 
powers of local government and related to public health and safety”). 
 223 See Letter from Christopher N. Lasch et al., Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. 
Of Law, to Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary & Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, 
Subcomm. on Immigration & Border Sec. 6–10 (Sept. 26, 2016), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/
JU/JU01/20160927/105392/HHRG-114-JU01-20160927-SD003.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDT7-BPNZ] 
(arguing § 1373 must be “construed narrowly” to avoid “serious constitutional concerns”). 
 224 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 36–37 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
The Second Circuit explained that New York’s policy, far from being a generalized confidentiality 
provision, “single[d] out a particular federal policy for non-cooperation while allowing City em-
ployees to share freely the information in question with the rest of the world.” Id. at 37. 
 225 N.Y.C., N.Y., Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34436585 [https://perma.cc/AX85-X8S4]; McCormick, supra note 14, at 188–89; see 
also Winnie Hu, Mayor Widens Privacy Rights for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/18/nyregion/mayor-widens-privacy-rights-for-immigrants.html 
[https://perma.cc/CCE2-SHL4] (discussing Mayor Bloomberg’s 2003 executive order). 
 226 See supra note 214 (collecting policies); see also New Haven Dep’t of Police Serv., Gen-
eral Order No. 06-2, Disclosure of Status Information: Policies and Procedures ¶ III.B (Sept. 22, 
2006) [hereinafter New Haven PD Order], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434251 
[https://perma.cc/TC76-62RY] (justifying non-disclosure policy on the ground that “[o]btaining 
pertinent information may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of confi-
dentiality is not preserved, and preserving confidentiality in turn requires that the department regu-
late the use of such information by its employees”); S.F. Complaint, supra note 57, at 20 (arguing 
§ 1373 cannot be constitutionally applied to prohibit confidentiality requirements in San Francis-
co’s Sanctuary City law “enacted to further legitimate local interests grounded in the basic police 
powers of local government and related to public health and safety”). 
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In addition to the examples discussed above, Santa Ana, California re-
cently passed an ordinance with broad confidentiality protections distin-
guishable from the problematic policy at issue in City of New York. The 
Santa Ana City Council decreed that sensitive information would not be 
disclosed unless required by law, but the ordinance defines “sensitive in-
formation” broadly to include: 
any information that may be considered sensitive or personal by 
nature, including a person’s status as a victim of domestic abuse or 
sexual assault; status as a victim or witness to a crime generally; 
citizenship or immigration status; status as a recipient of public as-
sistance; sexual orientation; biological sex or gender identity; or 
disability.227 
Local confidentiality policies such as Santa Ana’s are particularly im-
portant in the Trump era. The Trump administration has abandoned policies 
previously in place under the Obama administration that allowed certain 
immigrants to be considered for a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion, including victims, witnesses, and those who had experienced viola-
tions of their civil rights, employment, or housing rights.228 These and other 
individuals who have important reasons to interact with local government 
officials will no longer receive protection from deportation if they end up in 
the hands of ICE. 
E. Precluding Participation in Joint Operations with  
Federal Immigration Enforcement 
A fifth type of sanctuary policy limits local participation in joint opera-
tions with federal immigration officials. Joint operations are collaborative 
law enforcement efforts in which federal law enforcement relies on local 
law enforcement to provide boots on the ground. When joint operations tar-
get immigrants for deportation, local law officials become participants in 
the federal government’s deportation efforts.  
Local law enforcement is under renewed pressure in the Trump era to 
designate local officers to enforce immigration law through a common type 
                                                                                                                           
 227 Santa Ana, Cal., Ordinance No. NS-2908 §§ 3–4, 9 (Jan. 17, 2017), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432113 [https://perma.cc/2HEA-QGU2]. The limitation applies to all 
city agencies and employees, including law enforcement. 
 228 See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All 
Field Office Dirs. et al. (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/
certain-victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GYJ-N2NH]. 
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of joint operation, 287(g) agreements.229 Sanctuary jurisdictions have re-
sponded by declaring their intent not to participate in this program.230 For 
example, Seattle’s “Welcoming City” resolution, which was adopted fol-
lowing President Trump’s inauguration, clarifies that the city “will reject 
any offer from the federal government to enter into a Section 287(g) agree-
ment.”231 In 2012 the town of Amherst, Massachusetts adopted a similar 
policy that explicitly prohibits 287(g) agreements.232 The New York State 
Attorney General’s Office has also distributed a “model sanctuary” policy 
that, among other provisions, provides that local law enforcement “shall not 
perform the functions of a federal immigration officer or otherwise engage 
in the enforcement of federal immigration law—whether pursuant to 
§ 1357(g) of Title 8 of the United States Code or under any other law, regu-
lation, or policy.”233 
Beyond 287(g) agreements, there are other types of joint operations 
that may involve immigration enforcement as well, such as when local po-
lice team up with HSI’s “National Gang Unit” or the “National Fugitive 
Operations Team.”234 Some jurisdictions have barred local participation in 
such joint operations. Often, such policies prohibit local criminal justice 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 112–13 (Jan. 2013), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidable-
machinery [https://perma.cc/N3DK-Z4NH] (describing DHS partnerships with local law enforce-
ment). 
 230 287(g) agreements cannot be entered without local consent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9) 
(2012) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any State or political subdivision 
of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.”). 
 231 Seattle Resolution, supra note 214, § 1(B). Moreover, the resolution requires the Seattle 
Police Department (“SPD”) and the Law Department to examine the city’s “mutual aid agree-
ments” with other jurisdictions and propose “amendments to the City’s mutual aid agreements 
with jurisdictions that have not explicitly rejected offers to enter into a Section 287(g) agreement 
to be consistent with the SPD and The City of Seattle’s position related to focusing its limited law 
enforcement resources on criminal investigations rather than civil immigration law violations.” Id. 
§ 1(C). 
 232 Amherst, Mass., Article 29. Petition Article—Bylaw Regarding Sharing of Information 
with Federal Agencies (May 21, 2012) [hereinafter Amherst Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.
edu/ld.php?content_id=34434966 [https://perma.cc/PBM5-SV4P] (providing that the Town of 
Amherst “shall not participate in federal law enforcement programs relating to immigration en-
forcement, including but not limited to, Secure Communities, and cooperative agreements with the 
federal government under [which] town personnel participate in the enforcement of immigration 
laws, such as those authorized by Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act”). 
 233 ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., GUIDANCE CONCERNING 
LOCAL AUTHORITY PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND MODEL SANCTUARY 
PROVISIONS 9 (Jan. 2017, & Supp. Mar. 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=
35849877 [https://perma.cc/X7FD-2JSJ]. 
 234 See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text (introducing two joint operation pro-
grams that rely on coordination between federal immigration officials and local law enforcement 
officers). 
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agencies from participating in “civil” immigration enforcement,235 but some 
jurisdictions’ negative experiences with joint operations have pushed them 
even further. 
In Oakland, California, for example, one of the nation’s early sanctu-
ary city resolutions called on city employees to refrain from providing as-
sistance or cooperation “relating to the alleged violations of the civil provi-
sions of the immigration laws.”236 In 2007, Oakland reaffirmed its “City of 
Refuge” status through a resolution condemning the immigration raids tak-
ing place under the administration of President George W. Bush.237 The 
2007 resolution maintained the same focus on disentangling city officials 
from civil immigration enforcement while explicitly allowing joint opera-
tions “in matters involving criminal activity and the protection of public 
safety.”238 A resolution passed in the wake of the 2016 presidential election 
likewise maintained a distinction between civil and criminal enforcement, 
condemning cooperation with respect to the former but not the latter.239 
Six months into the Trump presidency, however, Oakland changed 
course. The City Council resolved to “immediately” cancel a memorandum 
of understanding with HSI that allowed local officers to be designated as 
“U.S. Customs Title 19 Task Force Officers.”240 In support of the resolution 
canceling the MOU, the council cited the Trump administration’s plans for 
mass deportation and ICE’s “willing[ness] to lie . . . to their local law en-
                                                                                                                           
 235 In New Mexico, for example, the Doña Ana County Commissioners passed a resolution 
stating that “no County funds or resources” would be used for immigration enforcement, and spe-
cifically prohibiting “[a]ssisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity,” with federal operations 
“relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal immigration law.” Doña Ana 
Cty., N.M., Bd. of Comm’rs, Res. No. 2014-91 (Sept. 9, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34435968 [https://perma.cc/G3KX-ETQC]; see also Boulder Ordinance, supra note 
17 (prohibiting use of city funds to “assist with any investigation into a person’s immigration 
status” or “assist in the detention of any person based on a person’s suspected immigration sta-
tus”); Office of Wash. Governor Jay Inslee, Exec. Order No. 17-01 ¶ 8 (Feb. 23, 2017), http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437156 [https://perma.cc/A7WC-LBSL] (broadly prohib-
iting use of “agency or department monies, facilities, property, equipment, or personnel for the 
purpose of targeting or apprehending persons for violation of federal civil immigration laws”); 
NOPD POLICY, supra note 200, ¶¶ 6, 7 (“In the event a member receives a request to support or 
assist in a civil immigration enforcement action he or she shall report the request to his or her 
supervisor, who shall decline the request and document the declination in an interoffice memoran-
dum to the Superintendent through the chain of command.”). 
 236 Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 63950, at 2–3 (July 8, 1986), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39060312 [https://perma.cc/9C2R-6YE7]. 
 237 Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 80584, at 2 (May 15, 2007) [hereinafter Oakland Resolution], 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432505 [https://perma.cc/4479-EA2V]. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 86498, at 2 (Nov. 29, 2016), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39018764 [https://perma.cc/V7XJ-8TXC]. 
 240 Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 86860, at 1–2 (July 18, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39019055 [https://perma.cc/2EAS-P5DH]. 
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forcement partners (e.g. Santa Cruz Police Department).” The last reference 
was to a February 2017 joint operation between Santa Cruz officials and 
HSI.241 
Oakland soon determined to go beyond even this step. Although it had 
been directed to terminate its MOU with HSI, on August 16, 2017, the Oak-
land Police Department provided traffic control for an HSI raid that resulted 
in the arrest of members of a Guatamalan family in West Oakland.242 Fol-
lowing a public outcry, in 2018 the City Council reframed Oakland’s policy 
to eliminate all cooperation with immigration enforcement, whether related 
to civil or criminal violations.243 Oakland’s Mayor Libby Schaaf also took 
affirmative steps to warn residents of an impending ICE raid in February 
2018.244 
Santa Cruz adopted a resolution in 2007, declaring that “to the fullest 
extent possible by law, the City of Santa Cruz shall not cooperate with ICE 
and shall prohibit the use of City funds or resources for any Federal immi-
gration enforcement.”245 On the eve of Trump’s inauguration, the city coun-
cil reaffirmed that no city resources or assistance would be used to aid fed-
eral immigration enforcement efforts, and explicitly prohibited local offi-
cials from “assisting with or participating in any immigration enforcement 
operation or joint operation . . . .”246 The City soon learned that would be 
insufficient when the Santa Cruz Police Department’s joint raid with ICE in 
                                                                                                                           
 241 See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
 242 Memorandum from Brian M. Hofer, Chair, Privacy Advisory Comm’n, City of Oakland, 
Cal., to Privacy Advisory Comm’rs (Oct. 5, 2017), https://oaklandprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/10/PAC_-_ICE_Raid_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M4A-HVSC] (describing events of August 
16). 
 243 Oakland, Cal., Res. No. 87036 (Jan. 16, 2018), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=39153876 [https://perma.cc/F7HD-TH35] (resolving that “OPD shall not provide law enforce-
ment assistance, including traffic support, to ICE, including any subdivision of ICE, in any capaci-
ty, except to respond to a public safety emergency”). The California Values Act also limits local 
law enforcement participation in joint task forces if “the primary purpose of the joint law en-
forcement task force is [] immigration enforcement.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7284.6 (West Supp. 
2018). 
 244 This step by Oakland’s Mayor reportedly caused the Department of Justice to investigate 
possible obstruction-of-justice charges against Mayor Schaaf and set off a heated media-media 
exchange between Attorney General Sessions and Mayor Schaaf, but so far has not resulted in any 
action by federal authorities. See Thomas Fuller, Who Is Libby Schaaf, the Oakland Mayor Who 
Warned of Immigration Raids?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
01/us/oakland-mayor-libby-schaaf.html [https://perma.cc/JNY3-YKFL]; Kimberly Veklerov et al., 
Attorney General Blasts Oakland Mayor Schaaf, She Fires Back, SFGATE (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:48 
PM), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Jeff-Sessions-to-Oakland-Mayor-Libby-Schaaf-1273
5135.php [https://perma.cc/KA98-SPAW]. 
 245 Santa Cruz, Cal., Res. No. NS-27,504 (Apr. 10, 2007), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=38569294 [https://perma.cc/5EVU-UWFM]. 
 246 Santa Cruz, Cal., Res. No. NS-29,187 (Jan. 10, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=39154376 [https://perma.cc/K3A3-7P4R]. 
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February 2017, less than a month after the city council’s resolution, resulted 
in the deportation of community members with no gang ties.247 This 
prompted the city council to quickly enact an ordinance specifically prohib-
iting such joint operations.248 
III. LEGAL AND POLICY RATIONALES FOR “SANCTUARY” 
 The imminent threat of deportation has caused more localities to move 
toward implementing more of the protective policies discussed in Part II.249 
In addition, the administration’s attacks on sanctuary cities appear to have 
prompted local leaders to articulate more precisely their reasons for main-
taining such policies.250 In Part II we described some of the different poli-
cies localities have adopted to distance their employees from federal immi-
gration enforcement efforts.251 Part III analyzes the legal and policy ration-
ales for these immigrant protective criminal justice policies.  
In identifying the rationales that support sanctuary policies, we focus 
on expressly articulated rationales found in the language of the policies 
themselves, including in their preambles, whereas clauses, or findings sec-
tions.252 We chose this methodology for for two reasons. First, sanctuary 
policies themselves have an important expressive function.253 They are 
statements made by local officials to their communities, and the words that 
are used indicate the expressive function being served. Just as there is a 
meaningful difference between a jurisdiction that explicitly declares itself a 
“sanctuary” and one that does not,254 there is a meaningful difference be-
                                                                                                                           
 247 See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text. 
 248 Santa Cruz, Cal., Ordinance No. 2017-06 (Mar. 14, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=39154393 [https://perma.cc/FPU8-39E6]. 
 249 See supra notes 181–248 and accompanying text. 
 250 See infra notes 259–356 and accompanying text. See generally Eagly, supra note 180 
(describing common policy rationales for what she terms “immigrant protective policies” in the 
criminal justice system). 
 251 See supra notes 181–248 and accompanying text. 
 252 See, e.g., Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (justifying its detainer policy in a whereas 
clause concerned with confusion about “the proper boundaries of the relationship between local 
law enforcement” and ICE); Seattle Resolution, supra note 214 (setting forth in the preamble and 
first “whereas” clause the rationale that the resolution would further inclusion and intergration). 
We did not attempt to mine legislative histories or other contemporaneous materials to determine 
whether there were additional sub rosa rationales that were not expressed in the policies. 
 253 See Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 605 (noting that jurisdictions with sanctuary laws make 
expressive claims by promoting a “self-conception as immigrant-friendly” and sanctuary laws 
constitute “critical integration measures”); Emily Ryo, On Normative Effects of Immigration Law, 
13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 95, 109 (2017) (arguing that ambivalence and conflict over immigration 
may lead the public to perceive immigration policies “not only as a source of reliable information 
about immigration and immigrants, but also as an embodiment of the community’s consensus on 
immigrants’ proper ‘place’ in society”).  
 254 See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
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tween a jurisdiction that prohibits its police from participating in immigra-
tion enforcement in order to conserve local criminal justice resources and 
another that does so in order to foster community trust. Second, stated ra-
tionales can materially inform what substantive policy provisions are adopt-
ed. For example, a sanctuary policy that is primarily motivated by a desire 
to encourage crime victims and witnesses to report crime may be suscepti-
ble to carve outs based on criminal history.255 But if a locality’s disentan-
glement policy is grounded in a commitment to diversity and inclusion, that 
may give stakeholders a stronger basis to argue against provisions that treat 
members of the community differently based on prior criminal history.256  
Applying this approach, the six most significant policy rationales that 
emerged from our research are: (1) the conviction that localities (and not the 
federal government) should control their own criminal justice priorities and 
resources; (2) a desire to avoid unlawful arrests and detentions; (3) the con-
cern that entangling police with immigration enforcement erodes trust among 
minority community members; (4) a commitment to preventing improper 
discrimination in policing based on race, ethnicity or national origin; (5) a 
desire to further diversity and inclusion; and (6) a wish to express disagree-
ment with federal immigration policy. There are, of course, other policy ra-
tionales that would support a jurisdiction’s decision to disentangle local law 
enforcement from immigration enforcement,257 but we focus here on the most 
commonly invoked rationales for the policy types introduced in Part II.  
In featuring expressed policy rationales, we acknowledge that there is 
not always a neat and discernible connection between the expressed ration-
ales and the sanctuary policy actions taken. This can occur because multiple 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (allowing detainer compliance in some cases involv-
ing serious or violent felony offenses); NYC Local Law 62, supra note 196 (including numerous 
crime-based exceptions to non-compliance with detainers). 
 256 See Seattle Resolution, supra note 214 (prohibiting any participation by Seattle in 287(g) 
agreements and refusing compliance with detainer requests unless accompanied by a criminal 
warrant issued by a federal judge or magistrate). 
 257 A desire to avoid family separation and economic disruption are examples of rationales 
that occur in some policies but are not developed in this Article. See, e.g., Multnomah Cty., Or., 
Res. No. 2013-032 (Apr. 4, 2013) [hereinafter Multnomah Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.
edu/ld.php?content_id=34436634 [https://perma.cc/YA3X-CYWQ] (“Multnomah County families 
are being separated and isolated by deportation, and in many cases, these removals are disrupting 
and damaging the lives and support networks of spouses, children and young adults who are US 
citizens.”); King Cty., Wash., Ordinance No. 17706, § 1(A) (Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter King 
County Ordinance], http://libguides/law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437163 [https://perma.cc/
2F6T-653T] (noting testimony concerning the “dislocation of families, the loss of jobs and hous-
ing, economic loss to families and the community, and harms to children” caused by immigration 
detainers); Berkeley, Cal., Res. No. 63,711-N.S. (May 22, 2007), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=34432521 [https://perma.cc/2PEM-R39K] (noting separation of children from 
parents caused by ICE raids, and “increased climate of fear and intimidation among Latino fami-
lies and students” caused by deportations). 
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rationales support a single policy action, or because the written document 
does not draw explicit connections between rationales and actions. Addi-
tionally, we recognize that, although we attempt to ascertain identifiable 
categories of rationales, there can be some slippage across the categories 
that we introduce. 
 Although the Trump administration has attempted to paint sanctuary 
cities as undermining public safety and defying the rule of law,258 this Part 
reveals the sound legal principles and considered policy judgments that un-
derlie the six common rationales that we outline here. Sheriffs, police chiefs, 
mayors, and governors have defended their sanctuary policies not only as 
legally and practically justified, but also as a necessary moral and ethical re-
sponse to the administration’s policies. Further, the Trump administration’s 
reliance on white nationalist rhetoric has fostered greater awareness about the 
need for sanctuary policies that address discrimination and multiculturalism.  
A. Maintain Local Control Over Criminal Justice 
One common rationale cited by local policymakers for sanctuary poli-
cies is the idea that local criminal justice resources should be allocated 
based on local, not federal, priorities. This rationale is grounded in three 
principles: a distinction between criminal and immigration law, an under-
standing that immigration is a generally a federal responsibility, and the 
Tenth Amendment guarantee of freedom from federal commandeering of 
local resources. 
As described earlier, cases dating back to the late nineteenth century 
have separated civil deportation law from criminal law and imposed strict 
scrutiny on subfederal regulation that discriminated on the basis of alien-
age.259 This jurisprudence placed responsibility for immigration enforce-
ment with the federal government and largely prevented states from treating 
citizens and noncitizens differently in the enforcement of criminal laws.260 
The Supreme Court’s landmark Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of the 
1990s rounded out support for disentanglement policies. The Court’s deci-
sions in New York v. United States261 and Printz v. United States262 established 
that the federal government may not compel or coerce states into participating 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See, e.g., Press Release 17-826, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Announces 
Immigration Compliance Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Pro-
grams (July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-sessions-announces-
immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrne-memorial [https://perma.cc/2ZCZ-BBLU]. 
 259 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 261 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 262 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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in a federal regulatory program.263 Today, these decisions support the pre-
rogative of states to resist requests by federal authorities to detain community 
members for transfer to ICE or otherwise do the federal government’s bid-
ding. For example, jurisdictions that have adopted “don’t police” policies bar-
ring their own officers from participating in immigration enforcement have 
insisted that enforcing immigration laws is the federal government’s respon-
sibility.264 San Francisco noted in adopting its “City and County of Refuge” 
ordinance in 1989 that state and local officials are under no obligation “to 
enforce the civil aspects of the federal immigration laws.”265 Pittsburgh based 
its 2004 direction that police “[r]efrain from participating in the enforcement 
of federal immigration laws” on the rationale that immigration laws “are sole-
ly the responsibility of the federal government . . . .”266 The same rationale 
has bolstered sanctuary policies that bar disclosure of sensitive information. 
In justifying its policy on nondisclosure of sensitive information, the City of 
New Haven, Connecticut declared that “[a] community member’s potential 
status as an undocumented immigrant has no relation to the mission or goals 
of the New Haven Police Department.”267 
Relatedly, policies limiting compliance with detainers and administra-
tive warrants have also been justified by the rationale of maintaining local 
autonomy over criminal justice resources. For local jurisdictions, the federal 
government’s attempts to press local officers into federal service conflict 
with their desire to preserve scarce resources for local priorities.268 An ex-
                                                                                                                           
 263 See id. at 925 (holding that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to imple-
ment, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs”); New York, 505 U.S. at 166 
(noting that “even where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring 
or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit 
those acts”). 
 264 Cook Ordinance, supra note 196; see also Santa Clara Cty., Cal., Res. No. 2010-316 (June 
22, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Santa Clara Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_
id=34432102 [https://perma.cc/2WJD-FHF6] (noting that “the enforcement of federal civil immi-
gration law is the responsibility of the federal government and not of the County”). 
 265 S.F. Ordinance, supra note 189. New York City similarly connected federal responsibility 
for immigration enforcement to its enactment of Executive Order 124. See NYC Exec. Order, 
supra note 189, at 3 (“Federal law places full responsibility for immigration control on the federal 
government. With limited exceptions, the City therefore has no legal obligation to report any alien 
to federal authorities. The executive order, in recognition of this lack of obligation and the im-
portance of providing the services covered herein, requires City agencies to preserve the confiden-
tiality of all information respecting law-abiding aliens to the extent permitted by law”). 
 266 Pittsburgh, Pa., Bill No. 2004-0295 (Apr. 26, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Pittsburgh Resolu-
tion], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436690 [https://perma.cc/9X9M-XZUR]. 
 267 New Haven PD Order, supra note 226; see also NYC Exec. Order, supra note 189. 
 268 See, e.g., Cook Ordinance, supra note 196 (“Cook County can no longer afford to expend 
taxpayer funds to incarcerate individuals who are otherwise entitled to their freedom”); 2010 San-
ta Clara Resolution, supra note 264 (noting that “in this time of economic difficulties, the Board 
of Supervisors remains committed to maximizing public safety, public health and vital services”); 
Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (noting that the “uncompensated detention of individuals 
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ample is the 2011 Cook County Ordinance, which created an absolute re-
quirement that the sheriff decline any detainer request in the absence of a 
written agreement with federal officials guaranteeing reimbursement of the 
costs of compliance.269 To date, the federal government has refused to reim-
burse local law enforcement for the significant costs associated with honor-
ing detainers.270 
Although the anti-commandeering argument was an obvious fit for justi-
fying limits on street-level immigration policing by localities,271 relatively 
few jurisdictions explicitly invoked it until the height of Secure Communities 
under the Obama administration in 2011 and then later under Trump.272 Until 
then, there was little need to resort to the anti-commandeering argument be-
cause the federal government had not yet attempted to directly co-opt local 
law enforcement into immigration enforcement without localities’ consent.  
                                                                                                                           
in county jails, for violations of civil immigration laws, places an undue burden on the county” 
and that “unmitigated compliance with ICE detainers requests has the potential of further straining 
the resources of the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office and occupying scarce and costly jail beds 
that should be reserved for those who pose the greatest threat to public safety”); see also Eagly, 
supra note 180, at 291–94 (discussing policies limiting entanglement due to budgetary con-
straints). 
 269 Cook Ordinance, supra note 196; see also 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264 
(noting that “the enforcement of federal civil immigration law is the responsibility of the federal 
government and not of the County”); 2004 Pittsburgh Resolution, supra note 266 (requesting 
mayor to direct police to “[r]efrain from participating in the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws which are solely the responsibility of the federal government”) (emphasis in original). 
 270 See, e.g., California TRUST Act, supra note 27, § 1(B) (“State and local law enforcement 
agencies are not reimbursed by the federal government for the full cost of responding to a detain-
er, which can include, but is not limited to, extended detention time and the administrative costs of 
tracking and responding to detainers”); Phila., Pa., Exec. Order No. 1-14 (Apr. 16, 2014), http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436655 [https://perma.cc/D5Z7-6L4D] (noting that “the 
Secure Communities program shifts the burden of federal civil immigration enforcement onto 
local law enforcement, including shifting costs for detention of individuals in local custody who 
would otherwise be released”); Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cty. Attorney, to Rebeca 
Sosa et al., Chairwoman, Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Miami-Dade Cty., Fla. (Dec. 3, 2013) [hereinafter 
Miami-Dade Resolution], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434395 [https://perma.
cc/QF63-FSZC] (reciting costs to Miami-Dade taxpayers of detainer compliance and pointing out 
that “the federal government does not directly reimburse Miami-Dade County” for those costs). 
 271 See Gardner, supra note 6, at 331 (describing the “slate of immigrant sanctuary policies 
passed after 2001 and predicated on the Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in 
Printz”). 
 272 Two early exceptions were Lawrence, Kansas and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. See Lawrence, 
Kan., Res. No. 6541 (Apr. 20, 2004), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434777 
[https://perma.cc/MY2G-LN69] (explicitly citing Printz in resolution affirming Lawrence’s 
“strong support for the rights of immigrants and oppos[ing] measures that single out individuals 
for legal scrutiny or enforcement activity based on their country of origin”); Milwaukee, Wis., File 
No. 031413 (Mar. 2, 2004), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437224 [https://
perma.cc/5D5G-MJBL] (noting the city’s opposition to “any unfunded federal mandates instruct-
ing local police to attempt to enforce the complex civil immigration laws of the U.S.”). 
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The Third Circuit’s 2014 decision in Galarza v. Szalczyk vindicated the 
claims of jurisdictions that had grounded anti-detainer policies in the Tenth 
Amendment.273 The district court had declined to hold the county liable for 
U.S. citizen Ernesto Galarza’s detention, even though it was unsupported by 
probable cause because, in its view, detainers “impose[d] mandatory obliga-
tions on state or local law enforcement agencies . . . including municipali-
ties, to follow such a detainer once it is received.”274 The Third Circuit re-
versed.275 Relying on New York and Printz, the court held that understand-
ing “a federal detainer filed with a state or local [law enforcement agency] 
[as] a command to detain an individual on behalf of the federal government, 
would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amend-
ment.”276 Detainers, the court said, must therefore be understood as “only 
requests that state and local law enforcement agencies detain suspected 
[noncitizens] subject to removal.”277 Subsequent cases have followed 
Galarza’s Tenth Amendment reasoning to conclude that the federal gov-
ernment cannot command localities to hold individuals on its behalf.278 
The Trump administration has sidestepped the court decisions about 
state sovereignty and threatened to cancel federal funding if sanctuary juris-
dictions do not cooperate with immigration enforcement efforts. As dis-
cussed earlier, these efforts to withhold federal funds have likewise general-
ly not been tolerated by the courts.279 The value of local autonomy will like-
ly continue to play a significant role in sustaining sanctuary policies in the 
years to come.280  
                                                                                                                           
 273 See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 638 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 274 Id. (citations omitted) (summarizing district court holding). 
 275 Id. at 645. 
 276 Id. at 644. 
 277 Id. at 645. 
 278 See, e.g., Mercado v. Dall. Cty., 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 514 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (citing cases 
that agree with Galarza), abrogated on other grounds by City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F. 3d 
332, 356 n.21 (5th Cir. 2018) 
 279 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 280 The rationale of local control is not without its downsides. The “states’ rights” frame has 
historically been associated with conservative recalcitrance to federal reform efforts, including in 
the civil rights arena. With respect to the treatment of immigrants, local autonomy is sometimes 
deployed in defense of anti-immigrant measures. Nevertheless, such assertions of local control are 
frequently bounded by equality principles acting either directly through the Equal Protection 
Clause or indirectly through the doctrine of preemption. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten 
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1, 40–51 (2013) (arguing that “immigrant equality 
is an essential—and forgotten—ingredient in contemporary Supremacy Claus analysis”); Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1723, 1730–46 (2010) (describing how anti-discrimination arguments on behalf of undocumented 
immigrants tend to be obliquely asserted through institutional competence claims like preemp-
tion). 
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B. Prevent Unlawful Arrests 
A second important rationale for sanctuary policy is avoiding unlawful 
arrests. While local officials were of course familiar with limitations on ar-
rest authority in the criminal context, they initially did not appreciate such 
concerns as applied to their entanglement with federal immigration authori-
ties. It took constitutional litigation to reveal that unlawful arrests are a key 
issue for localities considering sanctuary policies. 
The concern over unlawful arrests comes from three related lines of 
cases. The first line of cases established that local officials generally do not 
have authority to make civil immigration arrests. As described in Part I, 
when the federal government began to encourage states and localities to 
participate in immigration enforcement after 9/11, some jurisdictions eager-
ly embraced that role on the theory that they possessed “inherent authority” 
to enforce federal immigration laws.281 When the Supreme Court struck 
down much of Arizona’s immigration enforcement law as preempted by 
federal law in 2012, it confirmed that the power of local law enforcement to 
make immigration arrests is limited to the specific circumstances enumerat-
ed by Congress.282 An example of a policy basing disentanglement on this 
lack of federal authorization is the 2013 general order of the Princeton Po-
lice Department,283 which provided that: “State and local police have no 
authority to arrest and detain a person for a civil violation. There are federal 
agencies specifically charged with the enforcement and application of the 
complex immigration laws and regulations.”284 
The second line of cases supporting sanctuary policies to prevent unlaw-
ful arrests addressed the application of Fourth Amendment protections to de-
tention by local authorities on an immigration detainer. As discussed in Part I, 
the Secure Communities program was terminated by the Obama administra-
tion largely because of “the increasing number of federal court decisions that 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regula-
tion of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (explaining the “mirror 
image” theory and arguing its unconstitutionality as inconsistent with longstanding precedent). 
 282 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410 (“Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may 
not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited 
circumstances.”); id. at 413 (observing that nonfederal law enforcement arrests of individuals 
“solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns”).  
 283 Princeton PD General Order, supra note 200. 
 284 Id. at 2; see also VT. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING COUNCIL, MODEL FAIR AND IMPAR-
TIAL POLICING POLICY ¶ V(B) (2016) [hereinafter 2016 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY], 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437002 [https://perma.cc/CRM4-SM7X] (noting 
“Federal law does not grant local and state agencies authority to enforce civil immigration law”); 
NOPD Policy, supra note 200, ¶ 4 (“The enforcement of civil federal immigration laws falls ex-
clusively within the authority of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
(ICE).”). 
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hold that detainer-based detention by state and local law enforcement agen-
cies violates the Fourth Amendment.”285 These decisions, many of which fol-
lowed the Third Circuit’s decision in Galarza,286 established that detention on 
an immigration detainer constitutes a warrantless arrest.287 As with any other 
warrantless arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires such seizures to be justi-
fied. Suspicion of a civil immigration violation alone generally would not 
justify an arrest by local officials.288 In April 2014 a federal judge in Oregon 
made clear that the decision to comply with federal immigration officials’ 
requests to prolong the detention of inmates otherwise entitled to be released 
could violate the Fourth Amendment.289 The prolonged custody of the plain-
tiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares, was not the exceptional detention of a U.S. citi-
zen but rather a prototypical target of a detainer: a noncitizen whom ICE 
wished to investigate as removable.290 Immediately following the Oregon 
court decision, a wave of counties across the country, now facing the potential 
for liability for hundreds of unlawful arrests, declared they would no longer 
                                                                                                                           
 285 See Secure Communities Memo, supra note 149, at 2 & n.1 (citing cases). 
 286 See supra notes 144–148 and accompanying text (describing the line of cases concluding 
that police violated the Fourth Amendment by holding individuals in custody pursuant to immi-
gration detainers). 
 287 E.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at 
*9 (D. Or. Aug. 22, 2014) (holding that “detention based on the ICE detainer embarked Miranda–
Olivares on a subsequent and new ‘prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody’”); 
id. at *11 (“Absent probable cause, that detention was unlawful.”); see also Moreno, 213 F. Supp. 
3d at 1005 (noting federal government’s concession that detention “pursuant to an ICE immigra-
tion detainer constitutes a warrantless arrest”). 
 288 See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407 (“If the police stop someone based on nothing more than 
possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent”); see also, e.g., CTY. SHERIFFS 
OF COLO., supra note 197 (noting that “Colorado Sheriffs do not have the authority to enforce 
federal laws”). Consistent with this line of reasoning, a federal district court held Indiana’s law 
authorizing its law enforcement officials to arrest and detain persons subject to immigration de-
tainers likely violated the Fourth Amendment because it would “authorize[] the warrantless arrest 
of persons for matters and conduct that are not crimes.” Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. 
Supp. 2d 905, 919 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (preliminary injunction); see also Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 
F. Supp. 3d 791, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (noting that after Arizona v. United States, the law is settled 
that local officials cannot prolong detention on the basis of suspected civil immigration violations, 
and whether local officials can prolong detention on the basis of suspected criminal immigration 
violations remains an open question) (citing Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 
451, 464 (4th Cir. 2013)); Roy v. Cty. of Los Angeles, CV1209012ABFFMX, 2018 WL 914773, 
at *23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018) (holding that detaining inmate who was otherwise entitled to re-
lease, based on immigration detainer, was new arrest that sheriff could only justify if there was 
“probable cause to suspect that the individuals were involved in criminal activity”). But see City of 
El Cenizo, 885 F.3d at 355–56 & n.21 (reversing district court’s conclusion that detention on an 
immigration detainer violated the Fourth Amendment because probable cause of a crime was 
lacking, and disavowing similar district court decisions). 
 289 Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11. 
 290 See id. at *9. 
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accede to any ICE detainer requests.291 Sheriffs like those in Clark County, 
Washington and the City and County of San Francisco relied explicitly on 
these federal decisions in crafting policies limiting compliance with immigra-
tion detainers.292 
Finally, a third important line of cases built on the notion, reflected in 
some sanctuary policies, that civil immigration arrests by local officials must 
not only be authorized by federal law but by state or local law as well.293 This 
theory that immigration arrests had to be separately authorized under state 
law is what carried the day in Lunn v. Commonwealth.294 In Lunn, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court held that because Massachusetts law did not author-
ize state and local law enforcement “to arrest and hold an individual solely on 
the basis of a Federal civil immigration detainer, beyond the time that the in-
dividual would otherwise be entitled to be released from State custody,” they 
could not honor such federal detainers as a matter of state law.295 The Illinois 
                                                                                                                           
 291 Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to Hold Noncitizens for 
Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/us/politics/fearing-
lawsuits-sheriffs-balk-at-us-request-to-detain-noncitizens-for-extra-time.html [https://perma.cc/
B4PK-E44T] (reporting the decision by cities and counties across the country to refuse to honor 
detainer requests following an Oregon court ruling that a sheriff had violated a woman’s civil 
rights by holding her in response to an ICE detainer request). 
 292 Clark Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Written Directive (Apr. 30, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.
php?content_id=34437175 [https://perma.cc/JF5K-SEPM] (“As a result of the [Miranda-Olivares 
decision], and upon review of legal counsel, the Clark County Sheriff’s Office shall cease to hold 
individuals in custody when the only authority is a request from DHS ICE in the form of a detain-
er.”); Ross Mirkarimi, San Francisco Sheriff’s Dep’t, No Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Detainers (May 29, 2014), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34432181 [https://perma.
cc/T3P8-58PJ] (announcing policy of honoring ICE detainers only if accompanied by “judicial 
determination of probable cause or with a warrant of arrest”) (referencing Galarza and Miranda-
Olivares); see also News Release, Lane Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Lane County Sheriff’s Office Changes 
Policy on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detainers (Apr. 21, 2014), http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34436626 [https://perma.cc/7QU9-UUAF] (“In response to 
a recent federal court decision, the Lane County Jail will no longer hold inmates on Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Detainers without a warrant or a court order.”) (referencing Mi-
randa-Olivares); CTY. SHERIFFS OF COLO., supra note 197 (noting that “the courts have ruled that 
we have no authority to hold arrestees on administrative holds that have not been reviewed and 
approved by federal judges or magistrates”) (referencing Galarza and Miranda-Olivares). 
 293 See, e.g., Princeton PD General Order, supra note 200 (“Local police agencies must com-
ply with the laws of their own municipalities and states as well as the policies imposed by the 
police agency. State law may not authorize local police to detain persons for immigration viola-
tions . . . .”); 2016 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY, supra note 284, ¶ V(B) (noting “state law 
does not grant local and state agencies authority to enforce civil immigration laws”); Associated 
Press, Some Colorado Sheriffs Ending Immigrant Detainers, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2616407/Some-Colorado-sheriffs-ending-immigrant-
detainers.html [https://perma.cc/Q9PS-4KPN] (reporting email from Boulder County Sheriff stat-
ing there is “no state statutory authority for holding people on detainers”). 
 294 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017). 
 295 Id. at 1156–58, 1160; see also Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, Cisneros v. Elder, No. 2018CV30549, at 10–11 (Dist. Ct. Colo. El Paso Cty. Mar. 19, 2018) 
 
2018] Understanding “Sanctuary Cities” 1761 
Trust Act, enacted in August 2017, is an example of a post-Lunn sanctuary 
policy.296 Starting from the premise “that State law does not currently grant 
State or local law enforcement the authority to enforce federal civil immigra-
tion laws,” the act forbids detaining a person “solely on the basis of any im-
migration detainer or non-judicial immigration warrant.”297 
The individual and cumulative effect of these doctrinal developments 
has been dramatic. Today, they support policies barring local officers from 
holding individuals for any amount of time based on a detainer or administra-
tive immigration warrant. Significantly, because of their grounding in broad 
questions about the legality of civil immigration arrests effected by local of-
ficers, these policies leave little room for carveouts based on criminal history 
and instead broadly prohibit local officers from taking action based on sus-
pected removability. 
C. Strengthen Community Trust 
A third widely proffered justification for sanctuary policies is that en-
tangling street-level policing with immigration enforcement erodes com-
munity trust. Community trust is critical for effective policing programs.298 
As the Major Cities Chiefs Association warned in 2006, the entanglement of 
local police in immigration enforcement can “undermine the level of trust 
and cooperation between local police and immigrant communities,” creat-
ing a divide that undermines public safety.299 
                                                                                                                           
(holding plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that a Colorado sheriff 
lacked the authority to make civil immigration arrests pursuant to immigration detainers and that 
such arrests violated the Colorado Constitution). 
 296 S.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Session (Ill. 2017). 
 297 Id. 
 298 See generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES (2016) (examining the evolution of immigration enforcement 
from federally-managed border to control to a more widespread, piecemeal local law enforcement 
system). 
 299 CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., M.C.C. IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 6 (June 2006), https://
www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/MCC_Position_Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/SM3R-S6E6]; 
Conn. Judiciary Comm., Joint Favorable Report, Bill No. HB-6659 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.
cga.ct.gov/2013/jfr/h/2013HB-06659-R00JUD-JFR.htm [https://perma.cc/23YB-JD7K]. Sanctu-
ary jurisdictions have also relied on the testimony of community members and community organi-
zations for support about the chilling effect of deportation fears on crime reporting. See, e.g., King 
County Ordinance, supra note 257, § 1(A); Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (noting 
“[d]ocumented public testimony has demonstrated that members of our community are not report-
ing crimes . . . for fear of deportation through the Secure Communities program and I-247 Immi-
gration Detainers”); Miami-Dade Resolution, supra note 270. For more information about the 
relationship between sanctuary policies and public safety, see supra note 43. 
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Social science research has found that involving local law enforcement 
with immigration policing can strain relationships between community 
members and police.300 That fear can cause immigrants and individuals in 
mixed status families to refrain from coming forward as victims of, or wit-
nesses to, crime.301 Consistent with these findings, in the months following 
President Trump’s election, the LAPD observed a drop in reporting of sexu-
al assaults and spousal abuse among Latinos, leading the department to be-
lieve “deportation fears may be preventing Hispanic members of the com-
munity from reporting when they are victimized.”302 
The concern that entanglement can undermine community trust has 
supported a range of sanctuary policies. For example, a general order issued 
by the New Haven, Connecticut Department of Police Service in 2006 lim-
ited police officers’ ability to inquire into immigration status,303 prohibited 
enforcement of civil immigration law,304 and limited disclosure of infor-
mation to federal immigration officials.305 The policy was justified in part 
based on the community trust rationale: 
The department relies upon the cooperation of all persons, both 
documented citizens and those without documentation status, to 
achieve our goals of protecting life and property, preventing 
crime and resolving problems. Assistance from immigrant popu-
lations is especially important when an immigrant, whether doc-
umented or not, is the victim of or witness to a crime. These per-
sons must feel comfortable in coming forward with information 
and in filing reports.306 
                                                                                                                           
 300 Marjorie S. Zatz & Hilary Smith, Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and 
Reality, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141, 150 (2012) (concluding that “laws and policies involv-
ing local police in immigration enforcement have thwarted community policing and other efforts 
to cultivate improved relations with communities that include significant numbers of immi-
grants”). 
 301 See THEODORE, supra note 141, at 5–17 (linking police involvement in immigration en-
forcement with Latinos’ perceptions about public safety and their reluctance to contact police). 
 302 News Release, L.A. Police Dep’t, Decline in Reporting of Crime Among Hispanic Popula-
tion (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.lapdonline.org/home/news_view/61998 [https://perma.cc/GNS6-
PUTA]. 
 303 New Haven PD Order, supra note 226, ¶¶ II.C.1–2 (allowing inquiry into immigration 
status only while “investigating criminal activity”). 
 304 Id. ¶¶ II.C.4–5. The general order permitted officers to investigate and enforce federal 
immigration crimes. Id. ¶ II.C.3. 
 305 Id. ¶ III.B (justifying non-disclosure policy on the ground that “[o]btaining pertinent in-
formation may in some cases be difficult or impossible if some expectation of confidentiality is 
not preserved, and preserving confidentiality in turn requires that the department regulate the use 
of such information by its employees”). 
 306 Id. ¶ II.A 
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Interest in protecting community trust has supported not only street-
level policies disentangling policing, but also jail-level policies against 
complying with immigration detainers. For example, Milwaukee County’s 
2012 resolution prohibiting the use of detainers in county jails relied on the 
assertion that “when local law enforcement honors all ICE detainer re-
quests, including those that target non-criminal aliens, community residents 
become less likely to cooperate with local agencies, eroding public trust and 
unnecessarily hindering the law enforcement abilities of [Milwaukee Coun-
ty Sheriff’s Office] [d]eputies on patrol.”307 
Similarly, the California TRUST Act, a 2013 state-level sanctuary law, 
explicitly justified its policy on ways in which immigration enforcement 
can threaten community trust, warning that enganglement will make “im-
migrant residents who are victims of or witnesses to crime, including do-
mestic violence, . . . less likely to report crime or cooperate with law en-
forcement when any contact with law enforcement could result in deporta-
tion.”308 This concern about harming community trust led to a broad prohi-
bition on honoring ICE detainer requests except in circumstances involving 
individuals charged with or convicted of certain criminal offenses.309 Bos-
ton’s Trust Act is a similar example of a sanctuary policy based in part on a 
desire to protect community trust in law enforcement: 
When local law enforcement officials indiscriminately honor all 
ICE civil immigration detainer requests, including those that tar-
get non-criminal aliens, immigrant residents are less likely to co-
operate and public trust erodes, hindering the ability and effec-
tiveness of Boston’s police force.310 
                                                                                                                           
 307 See, e.g., Milwaukee, Wis., File No. 12-135 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Milwaukee Resolu-
tion], http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34437215 [https://perma.cc/ETZ4-DJ2C]; see 
also Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (noting that the “deterioration of trust in local gov-
ernment, as a result of ICE’s Secure Communities program and I-247 Immigration Detainers, 
hampers the county’s ability to provide public safety”) (emphasis added). 
 308 California TRUST Act, supra note 27, § 1(d); see also LONI HANCOCK, CHAIR, CAL. SEN. 
COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS 7 (July 2, 2013), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB4 (follow “07/01/13- Senate Public 
Safety” hyperlink to download) [https://perma.cc/VR8M-G6UX] (noting that California localities 
had complained that participating in Secure Communities was costly and harmed law enforcement 
relationships with the community). 
 309 California TRUST Act, supra note 27, § 1(d). 
 310 Bos., Mass., An Ordinance Establishing a Boston Trust Act (June 27, 2014) http://lib
guides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435561 [https://perma.cc/V5A6-SD83] (“When local law 
enforcement officials indiscriminately honor all ICE civil immigration detainer requests, including 
those that target non-criminal aliens, immigrant residents are less likely to cooperate and public 
trust erodes . . . .”). 
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And as in California, this concern about undermining trust between 
police and immigrant communities led to a refusal to honor ICE de-
tainer requests except in limited circumstances.311 
Like the policy justification that localities should control local resources, 
the community trust rationale supports an array of policy types. The commu-
nity trust rationale, however, particularly resonates with the following policy 
types introduced in Part I: barring investigation of immigration status, declin-
ing detainers, and declining to provide sensitive information. Each of these 
policies inserts a wedge of neutrality between a locality’s criminal justice sys-
tem and federal immigration enforcement. At the same time, some scholars 
have warned against placing too great an emphasis on community trust as a 
justification for disentanglement policies, as it draws on the idea that immi-
grants are “innocents needing protection from the police,” thus affirming the 
logic of crime and punishment for those, including immigrants, who do not 
meet exacting “standards of respectability.”312 The call for a return to 
“healthy relationships between police and communities may [also] ring hol-
low for [people of color and others] who are targeted by the police whether or 
not ICE is collaborating with them.” 313 
D. Safeguard Equal Protection 
Many jurisdictions have adopted disentanglement measures for a fourth 
reason: to promote the equal protection of law.314 The Fourteenth Amend-
                                                                                                                           
 311 Id. (allowing adherence to an immigration detainer request for up to forty-eight hours in 
cases involving individuals with a criminal warrant, a conviction for a violent crime, a felony 
conviction within ten years, current registration on the list of sex offenders, or placement on the 
federal government’s terrorist watchlist). 
 312 Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV.. 594, 
651–53 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 313 Id. at 653. 
 314 See, e.g., LAPD Special Order, supra note 186 (adopting disentanglement policy in part 
because “the Constitution of the United States guarantees equal protection to all persons within its 
jurisdiction”); Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance No. 2007-58 (Oct. 29, 2007), http://libguides.law.
du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435656 [https://perma.cc/4USY-4YAD] (basing disentanglement in 
part on equal protection); King County Ordinance, supra note 257 § 1(F) (adopting policy limiting 
detainer-based detention in part to “further advance the county policy of providing all county 
residents with fair and equal access to services, opportunities and protection”); Cook Cty., Ill., 
Res. 07-R-240 (June 5, 2007), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34434649 [https://
perma.cc/GPW6-ANYS] (adopting policy limiting inquiry into immigration status by county sher-
iffs, relying in part on the county’s “dedicat[ion] to providing all of its residents with fair and 
equal access to the services, opportunities, and protection county government has been established 
to administer”); OAKLAND POLICE DEP’T, TRAINING BULLETIN: ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL IMMI-
GRATION LAWS 1 (June 25, 2008), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35757904 [https://
perma.cc/TH8J-QRRC] (declaring commitment “to equal enforcement of the law and equal ser-
vice to the public regardless of immigration status”).  
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ment to the U.S. Constitution declares that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”315 Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, classifications based on race, ethnicity, nationality, 
and alienage are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and any attempt by state 
and local governments to discriminate on those grounds will ordinarily be 
struck down.316 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act likewise imposes clear obli-
gations on state and local officials to ensure that no program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance denies benefits or otherwise discrimi-
nates “on the ground of race, color, or national origin.”317 Additionally, 
states and localities may have their own anti-discrimination laws.318 Policies 
that distance local policing from immigration enforcement have accordingly 
been enacted in some cases to ensure that these legal commands are satis-
fied. 
Sanctuary jurisdictions recognize that involving police and sheriff’s 
departments in immigration enforcement efforts heighten the risk of dis-
criminatory policing. First, law enforcement officers who engage in immi-
gration policing may be more likely to treat community members different-
ly on the basis of citizenship or immigration status. Furthermore, in deter-
mining whom to target for further investigation, officers may employ per-
ceived proxies for immigration status like race, ethnicity, and English-
language ability.319 As a result, citizens as well as noncitizens can be subject 
to equal protection violations. The Town of Amherst, Massachusetts made 
this point when explaining the motivation for its disentanglement policy. 
The sanctuary policy adopted by the town in 2012 rejected local participa-
tion in immigration enforcement programs and specifically noted that the 
                                                                                                                           
 315 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 316 As the Supreme Court famously observed more than a century ago: 
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is ap-
plied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so 
as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar 
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the constitution. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 372 (1971) (determining that state classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect 
and subject to close judicial scrutiny”); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 216 (1944) 
(stating “that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immedi-
ately suspect”). 
 317 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 318 See, e.g., Amherst Resolution, supra note 232 (adopting policy of declining detainers re-
questing prolonged detention of inmates who would otherwise be released, in part on grounds that 
the Secure Communities program “violates the Town of Amherst Bylaws, including the Human 
Rights Bylaw”). 
 319 Id.; see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545–47 (2011) (discussing the use of race as proxy for citizenship). 
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Secure Communities program “explicitly promot[e]s discrimination on the 
basis of nation of origin and implicitly promotes discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, and socio-economic status . . . .”320 
Law enforcement leaders have long recognized that the elimination of 
bias in policing requires a proactive approach.321 Police agencies around the 
country are already facing a crisis of legitimacy as a result of police brutali-
ty and discrimination in criminal justice administration.322 Conscious of 
these dynamics, disentanglement policies are often adopted as part of a 
broader effort to avoid bias in policing.323 
Consider Vermont’s state law requiring that local police not engage in 
immigration enforcement.324 This law was precipitated in part by specific 
instances of discriminatory traffic stops of noncitizens.325 For example, a 
Vermont sheriff’s department paid nearly $30,000 to settle a case in which 
the state’s Human Rights Commission found that a sergeant had illegally 
detained a Mexican national after a traffic stop, “chiefly because of his na-
tionality and skin color,” and held him for about an hour to contact the Bor-
der Patrol.326 This and other similar incidents prompted the state legislature 
to mandate that all jurisdictions adopt fair and impartial policing practices 
and order the crafting of a model policy.327 
Threaded throughout Vermont’s model policy are anti-bias and equality 
rationales for its disentanglement provisions. The model policy states that 
police “shall not use an individual’s personal characteristics [as a reason] to 
                                                                                                                           
 320 Amherst Resolution, supra note 232. The fact that discrimination cannot be confined to 
undocumented residents and is broadly based on race and ethnicity is consistent with scholar Kev-
in Johnson’s view that the treatment of noncitizens affords a window into current racial attitudes. 
Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” 
into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1114 (1998). 
 321 See, e.g., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: A LEADERSHIP 
GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 153–55 (Sept. 2006), http://www.
theiacp.org/Protecting-Civil-Rights-A-Leadership-Guide-for-State-Local-and-Tribal-Law-
Enforcement# (follow “Part 1,” “Part 2,” “Part 3” to access report chapters). 
 322 See, e.g., Nick Bayer, Poll Shows Millennials Increasingly Worried About Police Brutality, 
Criminal Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2016, 6:10 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com.
mx/entry/millennials-police-criminal-justice-poll_us_57b38ceee4b04ff883994fef [https://perma.cc/
6YDV-H834]. 
 323 See, e.g., 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264 (finding that “laws like Arizona’s 
SB 1070 erode the relationship of trust between immigrant communities and local governments 
[and] subject individuals to racial profiling” and noting that the Board of Supervisors seeks “to 
protect the rights of all County residents to be free from discrimination”). 
 324 See supra notes 192–193 and accompanying text (stating the specific laws that prohibit 
Vermont police officers from engaging in civil immigration enforcement). 
 325 Kathleen Masterson, Vermont Sheriff Department Pays to Settle Instance of Discrimination, 
VPR (June 14, 2016), http://digital.vpr.net/post/vermont-sheriff-department-pays-settle-instance-
discrimination#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/74RK-E2MY]. 
 326 Id. 
 327 See supra note 192. 
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ask about or investigate [a person’s] immigration status.”328 Noting that the 
Fourth Amendment and analogous provisions of Vermont’s Constitution “ap-
ply equally to all individuals residing in Vermont,”329 the model policy pro-
hibits Vermont law enforcement from initiating or prolonging stops based on 
civil immigration matters, such as suspicion of undocumented status.330 Simi-
larly, it instructs that Vermont officers “shall not facilitate the detention of 
undocumented individuals or individuals suspected of being undocumented 
by federal immigration authorities for suspected civil immigration viola-
tions.”331 
Vermont is not alone in grounding its policing policy in equal protec-
tion rationales. Other jurisdictions have adopted “don’t police” policies af-
ter finding that local law enforcement participation in immigration policing 
led to racial profiling and discrimination. For instance, jurisdictions like 
East Haven, Connecticut, New Orleans, Lousiana and Maricopa County, 
Arizona have each adopted “don’t police” policies following litigation over 
discriminatory police practices that resulted in substantial settlements, con-
sent decrees or injunctions.332 More broadly, equal protection principles 
                                                                                                                           
 328 2017 VERMONT MODEL POLICING POLICY, supra note 193, ¶¶ VIII(a), IX(a).  
 329 Id. ¶ VIII. 
 330 Id. ¶ VIII(c). 
 331 Id. ¶ VIII(b). 
 332 See, e.g., Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing, United States v. Town of 
East Haven, No. 3:12-cv-01652-AWT (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2012); Consent Decree Regarding the 
New Orleans Police Department ¶ 183, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-1924 
(E.D. La. July 24, 2012) (requiring New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”), among other 
measures to achieve “bias-free policing,” to ensure that NOPD officers “not take law enforcement 
action on the basis of actual or perceived immigration status” and “not question victims of, or 
witnesses to, crime regarding their immigration status.”); NOPD POLICY, supra note 200, ¶¶ 2, 3 
(“Members shall not initiate an investigation or take law enforcement action on the basis of actual 
or perceived immigration status, including the initiation of a stop, an apprehension, arrest, or any 
other field contact. . . . NOPD members shall not make inquiries into an individual’s immigration 
status, except as authorized by this Chapter.”); Supplemental Permanent Injunction/Judgment 
Order ¶ 28(b), Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013) 
(requiring, as a remedy for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of class 
members, that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), among other things, not “detain[] 
any individual based on actual or suspected ‘unlawful presence’” or initiate any immigration-
related investigation without reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a crime, and obtain super-
visor approval before initiating any such investigation or contact with ICE or Border Patrol); Evan 
Lips, East Haven Board of Police Commissioners Approves $450,000 Settlement, NEW HAVEN 
REGISTER (June 10, 2014, 10:42 PM), http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140610/east-
haven-board-of-police-commissioners-approves-450000-settlement [https://perma.cc/43M3-7CQV] 
(reporting on policy adopted in response to DOJ lawsuit alleging that the East Haven Police De-
partment had engaged in systematic discrimination of Latinos requiring officers to “not undertake 
immigration-related investigations and [] not routinely inquire into the specific immigration status 
of any person(s) encountered during normal police operations.”); see also News Release, ACLU 
Washington, Victory in Lawsuit: Spokane Police Will No Longer Unlawfully Detain Immigrants 
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/victory-lawsuit-spokane-police-will-no-longer-
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also support policies that guard against policing practices that systematical-
ly deprive certain communities of police services.333 As referenced earlier, 
some sanctuary policies have been justified by a desire to ensure “fair and 
equal access” to services and protection for all members of a community, 
including immigrants and U.S. citizens in mixed-status families who may 
be concerned that a call to the police could lead to deportation of a parent or 
spouse.334 
Finally, the equal protection rationale can sustain disentanglement pol-
icies that go beyond the “don’t police” category to address participation in 
joint operations. The City and County of San Francisco recently withdrew 
from the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, in part based on “concerns that 
participation in the task force might violate local laws protecting immi-
grants and religious minorities.”335 As a spokesperson for the San Francisco 
Police Department explained, “[w]e want all persons to feel comfortable in 
contacting SFPD . . . to report crimes and emergencies without concern as 
to their immigrations status.”336 
E. Promote Diversity and Inclusivity 
Following the election of President Trump, the friction between federal 
immigration policy and the vision of inclusive communities held by many 
localities has intensified. The federal government’s deportation agenda is 
now seen by many as anti-immigrant, at a minimum, and even implicitly or 
overtly racist.337 This has spurred a new wave of immigrant protective poli-
                                                                                                                           
unlawfully-detain-immigrants [https://perma.cc/L4HH-8FSP] (describing settlement whereby City 
of Spokane, Washington, following an incident where officers referred a traffic accident victim to 
Border Patrol because he was Latino, “has agreed to modify its policies to clarify, among other 
things, that police officers shall not contact, question, delay, detain or arrest an individual 
be[cause] s/he is suspected of violating immigration laws”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 333 See Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]iminished police 
services, like the seat at the back of the bus, don't satisfy the government's obligation to provide 
services on a nondiscriminatory basis.”); Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“There is a constitutional right . . . to have police services administered in a nondiscrimina-
tory manner—a right that is violated when a state actor denies such protection to disfavored per-
sons.”); Grenier v. Stratton, 44 F.Supp.3d 197, 203–04 (D. Conn. 2014) (“The State may not, of 
course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating 
the Equal Protection Clause.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 334 King County Ordinance, supra note 257, § 1. 
 335 Ellen Nakashima, San Francisco Police Department Pulls Out of FBI Anti-Terrorism Task 
Force, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/san-
francisco-police-department-pulls-out-of-fbi-anti-terrorism-task-force/2017/03/10/62e05bcc-fd09-
11e6-8f41-ea6ed597e4ca_story.html?utm_term=.976e502469e6 [https://perma.cc/F97C-A7SW]. 
 336 Id. 
 337 See supra notes 34–165 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of “crimmigration”); see 
also Joint Statement from California Legislative Leaders on Result of Presidential Election, KEVIN 
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cymaking rooted in a fifth rationale: promoting the values of diversity and 
inclusivity.338  
The diversity and inclusivity rationale is related to but distinct from the 
more legalistic emphasis on equality and nondiscrimination that is seen in 
some disentanglement policies. It reflects a respect for and appreciation of 
diverse communities, even embodying a certain solidarity with those who 
have been historically marginalized. It recognizes that immigration enforce-
ment today spreads across workplaces, homes, schools, and neghborhoods,339 
and adversely impacts entire communities, including citizens as well as 
noncitizens.340 The rationale also embraces a broad view of inclusiveness, 
taking care not to single out certain groups of immigrants as more deserving 
than others.341 
 A 2016 enactment from Santa Monica, California reveals the vitality of 
the diversity and inclusivity rationale for inspiring disentanglement policies. 
Following the election, Santa Monica’s mayor declared that the Trump ad-
ministration’s actions did not “align with our vision of diversity and inclu-
sion,” and the city passed a resolution that used the city’s embrace of indi-
viduals of diverse religious, racial, national or ethnic origin, gender, and 
                                                                                                                           
DE LEÓN (Nov. 9, 2016), http://sd24.senate.ca.gov/news/2016-11-09-joint-statement-california-
legislative-leaders-result-presidential-election [https://perma.cc/S8FP-F2AF] (describing Californi-
ans’ votes against Trump as “overwhelmingly reject[ing] politics fueled by resentment, bigotry, 
and misogyny”); see also Seattle Resolution, supra note 214, at 3 (noting the “alarming” level of 
“anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric during the 2016 Presidential campaign, racist hate 
speech toward immigrant and refugee communities, and anti- immigrant and anti-refugee policies 
proposed by the current Presidential administration”). 
 338 See generally Eagly, supra note 180, at 298–99 (noting emergence of equality-based re-
form movements). 
 339 MOTOMURA, supra note 6, at 146 (noting that when some “states and localities” adopt 
laws that “insulate migrants from federal enforcement,” they “reflect efforts to include unauthor-
ized migrants in communities built through interactions in neighborhoods, schools, and workplac-
es”). 
 340 Rachel Rosenbloom’s important work discussing the deportation of United States citizens 
has revealed the “enduring fragility of the citizen-alien distinction that forms the bedrock of im-
migration law” and ongoing role of “race in the construction of . . . citizenship.” Rachel E. Rosen-
bloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 
1969–70, 2015, 2018–20 (2013). For instance, the Chicago Welcoming ordinance lays out in its 
purpose statement, “[t]he City Council further finds that assistance from a person, whether docu-
mented or not, who is a victim of, or a witness to, a crime is important to promoting the safety of 
all its residents.” Chicago Welcoming City Ordinance, supra note 20. 
 341 See generally Serin D. Houston & Charlotte Morse, The Ordinary and Extraordinary: 
Producing Migrant Inclusion and Exclusion in US Sanctuary Movements, 11 STUD. SOC. JUST. 27, 
27 (2017) (arguing that traditional sanctuary framing come “with the cost of limiting activist sup-
port only to particular groups of migrants, flattening the performances of migrant identities, and 
positioning migrants as perpetually exterior to the US”); Yukich, Model Immigrant, supra note 16 
(discussing inclusiveness of the original sanctuary movement). 
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sexual identity or orientation as a touchstone for a new policing policy.342 
On that basis, and acknowledging the diverse foreign-born population in the 
city, Santa Monica crafted a resolution that wove together most of the sanc-
tuary policies discussed in Part II: a “don’t police” provision, a broad prohi-
bition on the use of city resources for civil immigration enforcement, and a 
nondisclosure provision to protect the privacy of residents from a variety of 
segments of the community.343 In announcing these policies, the mayor 
made clear that disentangling Santa Monica from immigration enforcement 
was part of a larger strategic plan to “maintain[] a diverse and inclusive 
city.”344 
The diversity and inclusivity rationale has the capacity to undergird the 
full typology of common disentanglement policies. This rationale has sup-
ported numerous detainer policies,345 restrictions on participating in joint 
operations, and broadly crafted resolutions to prevent local criminal justice 
resources from being diverted for immigration enforcement.346 
                                                                                                                           
 342 Letter from Ted Winterer, Mayor, Santa Monica, Cal., to Resident of Santa Monica (Mar. 
1, 2017) [hereinafter Winterer Letter], https://beta.smgov.net/strategic-goals/inclusive-diverse-
community/diversity [https://perma.cc/6LW2-2BXC] . 
 343 Santa Monica, Cal., A Resolution of the City Council of Santa Monica Embracing Diversi-
ty, Rejecting Hate and Discrimination, Clarifying the City’s Role in Enforcing Federal Immigra-
tion Law, and Promoting an Environment in Which Fear and Intimidation Do Not Chill Coopera-
tion with Local Law Enforcement and Other First Responders (Feb. 28, 2017), http://libguides.
law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=35254558 [https://perma.cc/G5J4-Z545]. 
 344 Winterer Letter, supra note 342, at 2. 
 345 See, e.g., King County Ordinance, supra note 257, ¶ 7 (grounding detainer policy in part 
on county’s “dedicat[ion] to providing all of its residents fair and equal access to services, oppor-
tunities and protection” and county’s “fair and just principle” meant to ensure “everyone feels safe 
to live, work and play in any neighborhood”); 2010 Santa Clara Resolution, supra note 264 (be-
ginning by describing Santa Clara as “home to a diverse and vibrant community of people repre-
senting many races, ethnicities, and nationalities, including immigrants from all over the world”); 
Multnomah Resolution, supra note 257 (grounding detainer policy in similar findings). 
 346 See, e.g., McMinville Resolution, supra note 18 (declaring McMinville “an Inclusive City 
that embraces, celebrates, and welcomes the collective contributions to the prosperity of the City 
of all persons” and prohibiting the use of city resources for immigration enforcement); Maple-
wood, N.J., Res. No. 3-17 (Jan. 3, 2017), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435908 
[https://perma.cc/BM5D-F3Y5] (declaring the “Township of Maplewood has long embraced and 
welcomed individuals of diverse racial, ethnic, religious and national backgrounds” and resolving 
not to “expend Township funds or resources” for immigration enforcement). Lansing, Michigan’s 
proposed sanctuary resolution was crafted in the City Council’s Ad Hoc Committee on Diversity 
and Inclusion that was formed for that purpose. See Lawrence Cosentino, Promise and Peril, 
LANSING CITY PULSE, http://lansingcitypulse.com/print-article-14223-permanent.html [https://
perma.cc/T2H2-UL7E] (proposing to bar “assisting or voluntarily cooperating with investigation 
or arrest procedures, public or clandestine, relating to alleged violations of immigration laws” and 
cooperating with ICE “to perform immigration law enforcement functions to identify, process and 
detain immigration offenders they encounter during their regular, daily, law-enforcement activi-
ty”). 
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F. Express Disagreement with Federal Immigration Policy 
Finally, our catalogue of stated rationales for sanctuary policies would 
be incomplete if it did not acknowledge a sixth rationale: explicit disagree-
ment with federal immigration policy. Many of the sanctuary policies of the 
1980s, for example, were express responses to what was perceived as the 
federal government’s unjust treatment of Central American asylum-
seekers.347 In the post-9/11 period, sanctuary policies were often a way that 
localities registered opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act,348 to federal im-
migration raids,349 and to Congress’s failure to enact comprehensive immi-
gration reform.350 
Disagreement with federal immigration policy continued to serve as a 
rationale for sanctuary policies during the Obama administration. Jurisdic-
tions regularly cited the failure of Secure Communities to achieve its stated 
priorities—particularly before the legal problems with detainers were fully 
exposed—as a reason for declining requests for detainer-based detention.351 
Jurisdictions that used failed federal policy as a basis for enacting policies 
concerning immigration detainers often stopped short of declining requests 
for detention altogether.352 This had the effect of imposing local immigra-
                                                                                                                           
 347 See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Pham, Constitutional Right, supra note 6, at 
1382–87. 
 348 See, e.g., Balt., Md., Bill No. 03-1122, J. City Council Balt. 3335, 3336 (May 19, 2003), 
http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435679 [https://perma.cc/S4SR-NAZ6] (finding 
that “federal policies adopted since September 11, 2001, including provisions in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act . . . and related executive orders, regulations and actions threaten fundamental rights 
and liberties”). 
 349 See, e.g., Oakland Resolution, supra note 237 (stating opposition to immigration raids and 
calling for a moratorium); Mayor & Council of Princeton, N.J., Res. No. 2004-R271 (Nov. 10, 
2004), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?content_id=34435922 [https://perma.cc/BH4T-EHTM] 
(responding to October 2004 raid and expressing strong disapproval); see also Gardner, supra note 
6, at 326 (noting that “most of the policy actions taken between 2006 and 2008 expressed concern 
that home raids by ICE damaged the relationship between police and local immigrant communi-
ties”). 
 350 See, e.g., Oakland Resolution, supra note 237 (finding that “local legislative action is an 
important way for cities . . . to positively influence the continuing national discussion about immi-
gration reform”). 
 351 See, e.g., Cook ordinance, supra note 196 (noting that “ICE detainers are routinely im-
posed on individuals without any criminal convictions or whose cases are dismissed”); COUNCIL 
OF D.C., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON BILL 19-585, “IMMIGRATION DETAINER COM-
PLIANCE AMENDMENT ACT OF 2012,” at 4 (May 8, 2012), http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/
00001/20120604161227.pdf [https://perma.cc/8585-9HNL] (Chairman Phil Mendelson reporting 
to all Council members) (noting that “[w]hile ICE has stated that the [Secure Communities] pro-
gram was meant to target the most serious criminals,
 
there are still reports nationwide of individu-
als who were arrested—not convicted—for minor crimes, and then ended up held under an ICE 
detainer and eventually caught up in deportation proceedings”). 
 352 For example, in 2012 Milwaukee adopted a policy of responding to detainer requests de-
pending on the criminal history of the targeted individual. 2012 Milwaukee Resolution, supra note 
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tion enforcement priorities on a federal government viewed as incapable of 
making measured enforcement choices on its own.353 
Policies enacted since the 2016 election offer more recent examples of 
political resistance. The City of Richmond, California, for example, posi-
tioned itself in opposition to President Trump and his immigration policies 
by passing a resolution finding that “President-elect Donald Trump ran a 
campaign on a message of hate and bigotry,” and stating that “no matter the 
threats made by President-elect Trump, Richmond will continue our sanctu-
ary polices.”354 Officials in South Orange, New Jersey also passed a sanctu-
ary ordinance after the election, viewing the label as a “badge of honor” in 
the current political climate.355 
Although we highlight this recurrent rationale, care should be taken 
not to dismiss sanctuary policies as simply statements in opposition to the 
federal government. Our research reveals that sanctuary cities are pursuing 
affirmative policy choices that are theirs to make.356 Seen in this light, dis-
entanglement is not simply an attempt to frustrate federal policy, but an ef-
fort to ensure that local governments and the federal government can oper-
ate independently in their respective policymaking arenas. 
                                                                                                                           
307 (noting that “despite ICE’s prioritization of certain classes of criminal aliens, ICE detainers 
are routinely imposed on individuals without any criminal convictions or whose cases have been 
dismissed, resulting in possible deportation proceedings against non-criminal aliens”); see also, 
e.g., King County Ordinance, supra note 257, ¶¶ 10–11 (reporting that 78% of detainers received 
at the King County adult jail between 2008 and 2011 targeted persons with no prior criminal histo-
ry, and limited detainer compliance to those convicted of a “violent or serious crime”). 
 353 This policy rationale for limiting local involvement in immigration enforcement embraces 
the idea that immigration enforcement is related to local public safety. In contrast to more inclu-
sive frameworks, see supra notes 337–346 and accompanying text, this policy rationale accepts 
the idea that immigrants can be sorted into “deserving” and “undeserving” along an axis of crimi-
nality. As Ingrid Eagly has put it: “[I]ntegration-framed criminal justice policy debates have fo-
cused on whether the federal government is in fact deporting criminals, or whether the crimes 
committed by deportees are in fact serious. Even worse, the dominant conversation on integrating 
worthy immigrants has given way to allowing ‘criminal aliens’ to be used as what Rebecca Sharp-
less calls a ‘foil’ to advocate on behalf of immigrant-friendly policies only for law-abiding immi-
grants that everyone agrees should be integrated.” Eagly, supra note 180, at 290 (citing Rebecca 
Sharpless, ‘‘Immigrants Are Not Criminals”: Respectability, Immigration Reform, and Hyperin-
carceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 692 (2016)). 
 354 See Richmond Resolution, supra note 19. 
 355 Jessica Mazzola, Why a Town That Has Never Been Approached by ICE Is Now a ‘Sanctuary 
City,’ NJ.COM (Feb. 16, 2017, 9:09 AM), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2017/02/why_a_town_
that_has_never_been_approached_by_ice_i.html [https://perma.cc/LZA9-B5VV].  
 356 See supra notes 261–346 and accompanying text. In a forthcoming article, Jason Cade 
describes sanctuary policies as a “front-line” effort to restore legitimacy, fairness, and accuracy in 
the administration of federal immigration law under the Trump presidency. See generally Jason A. 
Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration Enforcement, 113 NW. 
UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3053609 
[https://perma.cc/L68Y-QW68]. 
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In conclusion, the rich array of rationales for sanctuary policies that 
this Part has laid out illustrates that sanctuary policies rest on a nuanced 
theoretical framework. Our discussion of these rationales also demonstrates 
that different localities may rely on different or multiple rationales for their 
sanctuary policies. Finally, Part III highlights some of the practical conse-
quences of entanglement that localities are responding to. Detainer policies, 
for example, may be grounded on the practical reality of avoiding liability 
for constitutional rights violations. Similarly, retaining local control over 
local criminal justice resources may have financial consequences because 
most joint operations, including through 287(g) agreements, require the in-
vestment of considerable local resources. 
CONCLUSION 
The Obama administration deported a record 2.7 million people over 
the course of eight years. The Trump administration promises to ratchet up 
both the level and modes of enforcement. In the words of former White 
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer, the President has removed the “shack-
les” from enforcement agents.357 This unshackling of deportation resources 
has raised the stakes of the “sanctuary city” debate, prompting local juris-
dictions to confront hard questions about whether and how to disentangle 
local criminal justice actors from federal immigration enforcement efforts 
and protect their residents from the harm and disruption of detention and 
deportation. 
The goal of this Article has been to present the facts necessary for a 
fuller understanding of the complex issues embedded in the sanctuary de-
bate. Our examination of local resistance to federal immigration enforce-
ment initiatives reveals that the Trump administration’s broad claim that 
sanctuary policies flout federal law are misplaced. The actions that jurisdic-
tions have undertaken to effectuate disentanglement are supported by deep-
ly rooted rationales designed to achieve a multiplicity of local policy goals. 
Indeed, many jurisdictions adopted disentanglement policies specifically to 
comply with federal law, sometimes even as a remedial measure for appar-
ent constitutional violations. The only specific federal law cited by oppo-
nents of sanctuary policies as being undermined—8 U.S.C. § 1373—is nar-
row in scope, and jurisdictions have worked to craft their disentanglement 
policies to avoid violating it. Far from finding a legal conflict that must be 
reconciled in favor of the administration, our Article shows that sanctuary 
                                                                                                                           
 357 Nicholas Kulish et al., Immigration Agents Discover New Freedom to Deport Under Trump, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/us/ice-immigrant-deportations-
trump.html [https://perma.cc/8KES-S3C7]. 
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cities are engaging in activity that falls within their long-established domain 
of local criminal justice policymaking. 
 
 
